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The Refund to Savings (R2S) initiative, a product of a unique collaboration among partners from academia and industry, seeks to improve 
the financial security of low- and middle-income 
(LMI) households by promoting saving of federal tax 
refunds. Researchers from Washington University 
in St. Louis and Duke University have worked with 
Intuit, Inc., the maker of TurboTax software, to 
design and test scalable interventions that encourage 
tax filers to save a portion of their federal tax 
refunds and that streamline the process of depositing 
refunds directly to savings vehicles. These computer-
based interventions are low cost and low touch; 
that is, only a minimal investment of personnel 
is required to deliver the interventions to great 
numbers of people.
The annual occasion of filing taxes (“tax time”) 
presents a unique opportunity to encourage and 
facilitate saving behavior at a time when people 
anticipate receiving lump sums—tax refunds—beyond 
usual income. In 2013 (tax year 2012), approximately 
680,000 refund-eligible tax filers participated in 
the R2S experiment, which Intuit embedded in 
TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE), the tax-preparation 
software that Intuit offers for free to qualified LMI 
households. The experiment’s randomized controlled 
design enables rigorous evaluation of a variety of 
interventions to increase the number of savers and 
the dollar amounts saved. This report presents results 
from an evaluation of R2S interventions in 2013.
Principles of behavioral economics informed the content 
of messages and the format of these interventions. In 
addition, the experiment was designed to make saving 
a salient default option. We tested two main behavioral 
mechanisms in varying combinations throughout the 
2013 tax-filing season: (a) motivational prompts and (b) 
suggested savings amounts (anchors). 
Six primary research questions are addressed by the R2S 
experiment:
•	 Can behavioral economics techniques increase 
the number of people who deposit to savings at 
tax time?
•	 Can R2S encourage filers to split their refund, 
allocating a portion to savings?
•	 Does R2S increase the amount of money 
deposited into savings at tax time?
•	 Do R2S interventions increase the number of 
people who save their refund for 6 months?
•	 Can R2S increase the proportion of refund saved 
6 months? 
•	 What can R2S administrative and survey data tell 
us about the financial lives of LMI households?
Data for this evaluation come from two sources. Data 
on income, tax credits and deductions claimed, tax 
ExECUTIVE SUmmARy
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refund amount, and the participant’s chosen method 
for receipt of the refund (e.g., via direct deposit into 
a savings account) are collected by the TTFE software. 
This information is complemented by data from two 
waves of a survey administered by the researchers. 
Immediately after submitting their tax returns, 20,816 
filers responded to an invitation to take a detailed 
Household Financial Survey, which thoroughly examined 
assets, liabilities, intended use of tax refunds, 
product preferences, behavioral characteristics, and 
demographic traits. Six months later, 8,484 of those 
respondents participated in the second wave of the 
survey and reported on their actual use of the refunds. 
Data from the longitudinal survey also offer useful 
insights into the financial lives of LMI households. 
It is important to understand the context in which 
those households are trying to save and the methods 
of coping with contingencies when savings are not 
available. Such knowledge is key in designing effective 
strategies to encourage saving. Details on the balance 
sheets, tax credits taken, and predictors of saving 
behavior can inform researchers and policymakers 
interested in improving the financial well-being of LMI 
households. The data collected via the TTFE software 
and Household Financial Survey enable us to assess 
whether the R2S interventions’ effects on savings 
outcomes persist 6 months after filing.
Results from the R2S experiment show that minor 
design changes informed by behavioral economics can 
increase both the number of tax filers who deposit a 
portion of their refund into savings vehicles and the 
amount saved. We estimate that an additional 4,800 
tax filers deposited some part of their refund into a 
savings vehicle because of the R2S interventions and 
that R2S interventions increased the amount saved by 
approximately 6 million dollars. Although the effects of 
the tested interventions are modest, the reach is broad 
and cumulatively substantial for such a low-touch, 
low-cost approach. The potential impact on individual 
households may be considerable.
It is noteworthy that the R2S interventions continued 
to affect the probability of saving and the percentage 
of the refund saved for at least 6 months after 
participants filed their taxes. In particular, we find 
that high anchoring (i.e., suggesting that filers save 
50% or 75% of their refund) significantly increases the 
probability of saving and the percentage of the refund 
saved.
The two-wave Household Financial Survey provides 
valuable insights into the financial situations and 
challenges of LMI households. We find that nearly 
two thirds of households used some part of their tax 
refunds to pay down debt, and more than one in 10 
households has already mentally allocated next year’s 
refund for paying down debt. By several measures, our 
findings suggest that debt repayment, even more than 
spending, competes with the ability to save.
A close look at the balance sheets of these LMI 
households reveals evidence of a challenging financial 
environment. The median value of nonproperty assets 
was $1,300, and the median value of nonproperty 
liabilities was $10,000. If one includes property 
holdings as well as debt and other liabilities, the 
median net worth in this population was negative 
($1,100). Student debt plays an important role in these 
households: Over half of households reported debt from 
education, and the median liability was $20,000. 
Data from the survey also reveal that the financial lives 
of participants were quite volatile in the months after 
they filed their tax returns. Two thirds of participants 
reported a trip to the hospital, major vehicle 
repair, period of unemployment, or legal expense. 
These negative financial shocks are associated with 
economically detrimental behaviors such as the use of 
high-cost alternative financial services, skipping bill 
and rent payments, and overdrawing bank accounts. 
Lessons from the 2013 R2S experiment can inform 
policy discussions on efficient and effective 
interventions to increase the financial stability and 
mobility of vulnerable populations. The experiment 
shows that behavioral economics techniques can be 
used in a low-touch, scalable manner to increase saving 
behavior at tax time, and these effects are sustained 
for at least 6 months.
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 7
part One
The Refund to Savings Experiment
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The 2013 experiment tested two main behavioral 
mechanisms: (a) motivational prompts and 
(b) suggested savings amounts (also known as 
anchors). These mechanisms, employed in several 
combinations, are intended to increase the ease and 
personal relevance of saving at tax time. Instead 
of requiring taxpayers to opt into depositing their 
refunds into a savings vehicle, the experiment 
tested the effect of making saving a salient 
default option. The test employed motivational 
messages to prompt the participant to think about 
a specific reason for saving (e.g., for an unforeseen 
emergency, family, or the future). The electronic 
tax form prepopulated the relevant field with a 
recommended specific savings amount, or anchor. 
Thus, saving the suggested amount was the easiest 
option for the user, who would have had to adjust 
the form and supply new values if he or she chose 
not to save.
In this research, we are interested in whether small 
changes in the presentation of the tax-filing process 
can increase the likelihood that the LMI population 
saves and the level at which it does so. We determine 
this by tracking use of refunds for deposits into savings 
accounts and for purchases of Series I U.S. Savings 
Bonds. We also investigate whether motivational 
prompts and suggested savings amounts influence the 
amount of the refund directed to a savings vehicle.
Although testing the efficacy of R2S interventions 
remains the core focus in the initiative’s efforts, 
the collected data can be applied to address many 
questions of interest to policymakers. The scale of the 
research and the depth and quality of the data enable 
us to present a detailed description of the financial 
lives of a large cross-section of LMI households. Data 
from the two-wave Household Financial Survey (HFS) 
paint pictures of their balance sheets, hardships, and 
financial strategies. The data also enable us to assess 
I. OVERVIEw
The Refund to Savings (R2S) initiative, a collaboration among partners from academia and industry, uses insights from the field of 
behavioral economics to test low-cost, behavioral 
interventions to increase savings among low- and 
moderate-income (LMI) households at the time of 
tax filing (“tax time”). Building on the theoretical 
foundations of research on asset building and saving, 
the initiative seeks to improve the financial security 
and mobility of LMI households, to ensure that such 
improvements can be replicated on a national scale, 
and to inform public policy. In 2013, after pilot testing 
and development of an experimental design, we 
launched the initiative’s first full-scale randomized 
controlled trial to examine the possible impacts of 
several low-touch techniques on savings behavior. 
The R2S experiment is built directly into the TurboTax 
Freedom Edition (TTFE), an online version of TurboTax 
tax-preparation software. As part of its participation 
in the Internal Revenue Service’s Free File Alliance, 
Intuit offers the Freedom Edition without charge to 
LMI households. The R2S initiative’s 2013 work involved 
nearly 873,026 households, with 680,545 of those 
households randomly assigned in the experiment. The 
work utilized exceptionally accurate administrative 
data. In addition, the R2S team followed the 
experiment with a two-wave longitudinal survey that 
provides deep insights into the financial lives of LMI 
households. The team administered the first round 
of the survey immediately after TurboTax users filed 
their returns, and 20,816 respondents provided data. 
Of those, 8,484 returned to take the second survey 6 
months after filing. The combined data from the tax-
time experiment and the longitudinal survey provide a 
wealth of information on the participants as well as on 
the impact of R2S interventions at tax time and over 
the subsequent 6 months.
Research questions
• Can behavioral economics techniques increase the number of people who deposit to savings at tax time?
• Can R2S encourage filers to split their refund, allocating a portion to savings?
• Does R2S increase the amount of money deposited into savings at tax time?
• Do R2S interventions increase the number of people who save their refund for 6 months?
• Can R2S increase the proportion of refund saved 6 months?
• What can R2S administrative and survey data tell us about the financial lives of LMI households?
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whether the effects of the interventions persist over 
6 months. They reveal perceptions concerning the 
burden of student-loan debt, the availability of health 
insurance, and trade-offs between short- and long-term 
financial gains. They also show how LMI households 
utilize tax refunds. Thus, the R2S data set could be 
a valuable tool in designing policy interventions to 
improve financial stability and mobility.
In the pages that follow, we begin by presenting a 
theoretical foundation for policies to promote financial 
security through asset building, and we specifically 
discuss the importance of tax time for increasing asset 
levels. We provide a detailed description of the R2S 
research design, data, and methods before presenting 
results from the experiment and the HFS. We conclude 
with a discussion of findings and consider implications 
for research as well as policy.
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II. BACkGROUND
ASSET BUILDINg AND IMPROVINg BALANCE SHEETS
Historically, public policies in the United States have 
been designed to improve the financial security 
of LMI households by offering a combination of 
income maintenance, consumption support, and 
work incentives. Although these policies help many 
households meet daily needs and manage finances, 
they have been less effective in addressing the lack of 
savings and in facilitating asset accumulation. Recent 
surveys find that over a quarter of Americans report 
having no emergency savings (Ross, 2014), and many 
are rendered financially vulnerable if unexpected or 
emergency spending needs arise (Chase, Gjertson, & 
Collins, 2011; Collins & Gjertson, 2013). A range of 
psychological, social, and institutional barriers prevent 
LMI households from setting aside funds to meet such 
needs. Disparities in financial literacy and education, 
the paucity of saving incentives, and inadequate access 
to financial institutions greatly limit the capacity to 
save (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Lusardi, 2008).
In recent years, proponents of asset-building policies 
have developed approaches to complement traditional 
policies for promoting the financial well-being of 
LMI households. These new approaches attempt to 
enhance the ability of those households to build savings 
and weather hardship (Sherraden, 1991). One such 
approach promotes saving at tax time.
WHy TAX TIME?
Tax filing is a nearly universal experience among 
Americans, and several important factors make 
tax time especially ideal for efforts to boost saving 
behavior. First, the tax refund is the largest lump sum 
that many households receive in a given year. In 2013 
(returns for tax year 2012), the average tax refund 
was $2,755 per household (Internal Revenue Service, 
2013a). That is a sizeable one-time windfall for many 
and a potential source of savings for LMI households. 
Results from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey support 
this notion: On average, participants reported the 
intention to save 40% of their refund (Key, Grinstein-
Weiss, Tucker, Holub, & Ariely, 2013). Second, 
electronic filing options have altered the nature of the 
interaction with tax filers and enabled administration 
of low-touch, low-cost savings promotion interventions 
to millions of people. Eighty-three percent of tax 
returns are filed electronically, and around one third 
of electronically filed returns are self-prepared 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2013c). Third, the ability 
to receive tax refunds via direct deposit enhances 
opportunities for saving. The Internal Revenue Service 
(2013c) distributed more than 79 million refunds via 
direct deposits into checking or savings accounts in 
2013, and this number is substantially higher than 
the one from the previous year. Since 2006, the 
Internal Revenue Service has enabled filers to direct 
deposit refunds to multiple accounts by completing 
Form 8888. And since 2010, tax filers have been able 
to use the form to direct a portion of their refunds 
to purchase Series I U.S. Savings Bonds. Thus, the 
direct deposit mechanism and options on Form 8888 
facilitate movement of refunds directly to savings 
vehicles. Fourth, opportunities for saving have arisen 
with the growth of the network of electronic filing 
platforms in the Internal Revenue Service’s Free 
File Alliance, which focuses on tax services for LMI 
households. These platforms present the opportunity 
to scale interventions so that they promote saving 
to millions of tax filers at relatively minimal cost. 
Incorporating effective savings promotions into tax-
filing software may only require minor design changes, 
but the changes must be made thoughtfully. If these 
opportunities are harnessed, they have enormous 
potential to increase financial security among LMI 
households.
Recent evidence from other tax-time interventions 
affirms the importance of continuing to study such 
efforts. Tax-time interventions may facilitate interest 
in and utilization of savings accounts among LMI 
households (Beverly, Schneider, & Tufano, 2006; 
Beverly, Tescher, & Romich, 2004). They also may boost 
take-up of U.S. savings bonds (Tufano, 2011). In a study 
with tax filers in New York City who qualified for free 
tax preparation through the Volunteer Income Tax 
Assistance program, the $aveNyC program encouraged 
participants to deposit a portion of their tax refund into 
a savings account. To motivate saving, tax preparers 
offered monetary incentives to low-income participants 
who deposited a portion of their refund and did not 
withdraw any of the deposit for 1 year (Tucker, Key, & 
grinstein-Weiss, 2014).1 Around 70% of participating 
households saved their refunds for a full year, total 
savings amounted to $961,518 across all participants, 
and 72% continued to save after the program ended 
(UNC Center for Community Capital, 2013). Results 
from SaveUSA, the national version of the $aveNyC 
program, also show that most participating households 
saved for the full year and received a savings match 
(Azurdia, Freedman, Hamilton, & Schultz, 2013). Two 
similar incentivized-matching programs fielded through 
H & R Block successfully encouraged low-income tax 
filers to save a portion of their refund by contributing 
to an IRA account. In the 20% and 50% matching 
1Preparers offered a 50% match to eligible participants: 
For every dollar of the refund held over 1 year, the 
$aveNyC study paid a 50¢ match.
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conditions, average contributions to an IRA were 
four and seven times greater than contributions by 
participants in the no-match, control condition (Duflo, 
Gale, Liebman, Orszag, & Saez, 2005).
These and other tax-time interventions recognize 
taxpayers’ tendency to view tax refunds as financial 
windfalls (Shapiro & Slemrod, 2003). The tendency 
is based partly on people’s financial status relative 
to peers (Epley, Mak, & Idson, 2006) and influences 
consumption behavior in the United States during tax 
season (Chambers & Spencer, 2008). There also is a 
tendency to spend a windfall instead of saving it, and 
this may be a barrier that prevents many LMI filers 
from accumulating savings. However, interventions may 
reverse the tendency toward consumption if designed 
to help filers overcome psychological and behavioral 
barriers to saving.
THE NEED FOR SAVINgS
Asset-based interventions are driven by the perspective 
that financial security and well-being are determined 
by assets as well as by income (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 
2012; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2001; Sherraden, 
1991). By saving for the future and accumulating 
contingency savings, a household can build financial 
security beyond the limits imposed by income and 
expenses. In LMI households, assets may also function 
as a protective factor, improve financial well-being, and 
serve as a means of economic and social development 
(Sherraden & Sherraden, 2000). Contrasted with 
households that have liquid assets (e.g., assets held 
in savings products), households that have no or few 
liquid assets are 2–3 times more likely to experience 
material hardship as a result of income instability, job 
loss, medical emergency, death of a relative, or other 
unexpected life event (McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Vinopal, 
2009). Nonetheless, ownership of accounts that foster 
asset accumulation remains low among LMI households. 
Results from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey indicate 
that households with higher income are far more likely 
to hold asset-building accounts than LMI households are 
(Grinstein-Weiss, Tucker, Key, Holub, & Ariely, 2013).
Most Americans will experience economic insecurity 
at some point in their lives (Rank, 2005). Since the 
late 1960s, the risk of economic insecurity has been 
increasing for most Americans between the ages of 25 
and 60 (Rank, Hirschl, & Foster, 2014). Across all levels 
of the income distribution, American households are 
unprepared for financial shocks (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 
2013, Grinstein-Weiss, Russell, Tucker, & Comer, 2014). 
Many recognize the importance of emergency savings, 
but immediate needs and a lack of resources may 
limit the ability of some to set money aside (Brobeck, 
2008). This dilemma is not surprising in the context of 
economic trends and particularly the recent economic 
downturn. Wages for LMI households have flagged since 
the 1960s (Gordon & Becker, 2008). In 2011, roughly 
20% of all U.S. households lost nearly a quarter of their 
total resources (Hacker, 2012). The unemployment rate 
peaked at one in 10 in 2009, and though it has slowly 
improved (to about 7.6% at the time of this study), 
more than a third of the unemployed have been so for 
6 months or longer (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014a, 
2014b). The long-term unemployed face particular 
difficulty in reentering the job market (Krueger, 
Cramer, & Cho, 2014). These trends have contributed to 
the economically precarious situation of LMI households 
in the United States, and minority households have 
been disproportionately affected. A 2004 study found 
that 60% of households of color do not have the means 
to cover at least 75% of their monthly expenses, and 
the same is true in 40% of working-age households 
(Shapiro, Oliver, & Meschede, 2009). The likelihood of 
holding sufficient contingency savings is also correlated 
with factors like age, education, income, and marital 
status (Bhargava & Lown, 2006). Because of these 
factors, many households are vulnerable to the effects 
of unexpected loss of income and to necessary but 
unexpected expenses (financial shocks).
The experience of such financial shocks varies across 
households. Financial emergencies are more common 
in and have a greater impact on larger households. 
Expenses and child-rearing costs rise with household 
size. Also, households with more children have less 
emergency savings and are less likely to be prepared 
for unexpected expenses (Babiarz & Robb, 2014). 
Average annual expenditures per child range from 
$8,990 to $10,230 among LMI families (Lino, 2013), 
and a financial shock may significantly interfere with 
a family’s ability to meet these costs. Accordingly, 
households with children report difficulty coping 
with financial shocks, and the severity of such shocks 
is associated with the number of children (Lusardi, 
Schneider, & Tufano, 2011). Thus, encouraging families 
to save may be especially important and challenging.
A financial emergency can threaten an unprepared 
household’s economic, social, psychological, and 
physical well-being. When presented with a financial 
shock, many households seek out alternative financial 
services such as those offered by payday lenders, pawn 
shops, and check-cashing outlets. The services tend to 
be predatory and financially harmful. They typically 
charge exorbitant interest rates and fees, placing 
households in a difficult, long-term struggle to repay 
the obligation. These services and products often limit 
long-term savings, purchases of necessities, and access 
to credit and other financial institutions (Barr, 2012; 
Chase et al., 2011; Couch, Daly, & Gardiner, 2011; 
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Heflin, London, & Scott, 2011; Rawlings & Gentsch, 
2008).
Many people who encounter a financial shock and 
lack contingency resources experience psychological 
distress. Such distress can reduce the quantity and 
quality of interactions with members of their household 
(Rothwell & Han, 2010), negatively affect children and 
marriages, and lead to adverse effects on physical and 
mental health (Conger et al., 2002; Finke & Pierce, 
2006). Likewise, lack of adequate funds during a 
financial crisis may limit access to material necessities 
and result in material hardship, which can negatively 
affect health and well-being (Pilkauskas, Currie, & 
Garfinkel, 2012). Families coping with such events 
often forgo medical care or are unable to cover the 
costs of food, housing, and clothing (Beverly, 2001; 
Heflin et al., 2011). Having savings may reduce the 
incidence and impact of material hardship. Families 
that use banking services and own bank accounts are 
far less likely to experience material hardship than are 
unbanked and underbanked families (Lim, Livermore, 
& Davis, 2010). However, the lack of access to or 
engagement with a banking institution is an important 
barrier to saving, and it prevents many LMI households 
from accumulating assets.
PSyCHOLOgICAL AND BEHAVIORAL FACTORS
Recent evidence from behavioral economics provides 
a framework for understanding and promoting positive 
financial behaviors. Policymakers are leveraging this 
research to develop approaches that can increase 
economic security (Amir et al., 2005). As such research 
shows, people are not the rational economic actors 
that traditional, neoclassical economics would 
suggest them to be (Ariely, 2010, 2011; Becker, 1976; 
Caplan, 2000; De Bondt & Thaler, 1994; Kahneman, 
2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; List, 2004). Their 
everyday economic behaviors (i.e., saving, buying, and 
consuming) are predictably uncalculated and driven 
by psychological, social, and emotional processes. 
Furthermore, procrastination, inertia, and limited 
attention limit sound financial decision making 
(Johnson et al., 2012).
Such insights into cognitive biases have led proponents 
of asset building to develop strategies to encourage 
positive financial choices. Taking into account human 
irrationality allows us to adapt the ways in which 
information is presented and to consider which 
conditions will encourage individuals to override 
faulty perceptions. In other words, techniques based 
in behavioral economics have the potential to remove 
psychological and behavioral barriers to saving at tax 
time (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2009). Several 
lessons from behavioral-economics studies may be 
applied to interventions that encourage people to save.
Future orientation
Typically, individuals make decisions grounded in the 
present, but they discount the future (Benhabib, Bisin, 
& Schotter, 2010). Research on this present bias can 
explain why many do not save enough for retirement 
(Diamond & Köszegi, 2003). Interventions aimed at 
shifting the orientation of decision makers to the future 
show promise as pathways to encouraging long-term 
savings (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012; Hershfield, et al., 
2011). A related phenomenon is the tendency to assume 
that one’s financial, personal, and social position will 
be better in the future (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012). 
People may discount the likelihood of emergency 
events, including auto or home repairs, moving 
expenses, and health-related costs. These tendencies 
limit the likelihood of planning for such unforeseen 
events.
Findings from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey suggest 
ways to minimize present bias. For example, the survey 
prompted treatment participants to think about their 
future selves at retirement and asked them to register 
their intentions concerning the allocation of their tax 
refund. Among those with an annual adjusted gross 
income less than $35,000, treatment participants 
intended to allocate 13% more of their tax refunds to 
savings than control participants did (Key et al., 2013).
Choice architecture
Individuals are constantly presented with choices. By 
employing choice architecture—design features created 
to increase the salience and perceived attractiveness 
of a given financial choice—researchers can help people 
avoid common pitfalls in decision making (Johnson 
et al., 2012). In the process, researchers increase 
the likelihood that consumers will choose to improve 
their economic well-being or decrease the likelihood 
of that they will behave in a financially detrimental 
manner. For example, choice architecture might limit 
the number of possible choices so that the only options 
are financially beneficial ones. Such techniques have 
been used effectively in Medicare drug plans (Congdon, 
Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011) and investment plans 
(Cronqvist & Thaler, 2004).
The power of the default option
In many situations, people tend to rely on the default 
options given to them (Kahneman, 1991). This reliance 
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can stem from inertia or from their comfort in and trust 
of the status quo. Promising results have emerged from 
behavioral-economics interventions that leverage this 
tendency toward the default. Interventions to boost 
retirement savings show that making enrollment the 
default option (instead of requiring one to act in order 
to enroll) can increase utilization of savings products 
and might increase long-term commitment to saving 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & 
Madrian, 2009; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 
2004).
Anchoring
Informational markers or points of reference influence 
decisions involving the selection of a value, and this 
phenomenon is known as anchoring (Munro & Sugden, 
2003; Sen, 1993). Research shows that individuals 
generate their own anchors and tend to choose values 
close to the initial values considered (Epley & Gilovich, 
2001, 2004, 2005; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). Self-
generated reference points are vulnerable to faulty 
human perception because individuals rely on missing 
or incomplete information to create them (Epley & 
gilovich, 2006). However, people have a tendency 
to stay on or near anchors if such reference points 
are provided (Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010). A 
potential strategy to increase the amount of savings 
is to provide such anchors (for example, if we suggest 
saving 75% of the refund, we would expect filers to 
choose to save close to 75% of their refunds).
In summary, research demonstrates the need for 
emergency savings and the potential benefits of such 
savings for LMI households. Electronic filing programs 
create a special opportunity to encourage and facilitate 
saving at a time when millions of Americans receive 
a substantial sum of money. Incorporating several 
established principles from behavioral economics may 
enhance strategies to boost saving. This context has 
influenced the design of the R2S study and the findings 
detailed in this report.
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III. RESEARCh DESIGN
The R2S initiative is a large-scale, multiyear research 
project that tests the impact of interventions on 
saving behaviors at tax time. Designed as a randomized 
controlled trial, the experiment randomly assigned tax 
filers to one of several treatment conditions informed 
by behavioral economics or to a control condition 
with no exposure to an intervention. The use of 
randomization and a control group, design features 
that are widely accepted as benchmarks in clinical 
and field research, enable us to compare treatment 
conditions and isolate treatment effects. We expect 
that the different groups would have the same average 
outcomes if they were not exposed to the treatments 
and that we can attribute any differences between 
groups to the effect of the intervention.
PARTICIPANTS
As part of its participation in the Free File Alliance, 
Intuit offers the free online TTFE to filers who meet 
certain criteria. In 2013, tax filers were qualified to 
use TTFE if they (a) had an adjusted gross income of 
less than $31,000, (b) qualified for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), or (c) were an active-duty member 
of the military with an adjusted gross income of less 
than $57,000. The TTFE platform enables testing of 
interventions with a large, nationwide participant pool.
The experiment launched on January 31, 2013, the 
second day of the 2013 tax-filing season, and closed 2 
days after the tax-filing deadline: April 17, 2013.2 To 
test many different interventions, we split the tax-
filing season into three test periods: 259,429 filers 
participated during Period 1 (January 31–February 
13), 207,215 participated during Period 2 (February 
14–March 13), and 213,901 participated during Period 3 
(March 14–April 17). In each subperiod, TTFE assigned 
all users receiving a tax refund to a control group or 
to one of six treatment conditions, and the probability 
that a participant would be assigned to a given group 
was equal across the groups.3 The sample for the 2013 
R2S experiment consists of 680,545 LMI tax filers who 
submitted returns through TTFE and whose returns 
indicated that they were due a refund.
2Software developments necessary for the R2S experi-
ment were not ready to deploy until January 31, 2013; 
Filers who began preparing their taxes on or before 
January 30 (n = 95,857) were unable to participate.
3Because they could not be assigned randomly to a 
treatment condition, we excluded tax filers who start-
ed the filing process in a different TurboTax product 
and later used TTFE (n = 91,383).
INTERVENTION
The experiment tested two behavioral mechanisms: 
motivational messages (i.e., prompts) and default 
suggestions for the amount to be saved (i.e., anchors). 
The 2013 prompts reflect lessons learned during 
previous phases of the initiative (Grinstein-Weiss, et 
al., 2013; grinstein-Weiss, gale, et al., 2014; Key, 
et al., 2013). The TTFE software presented prompts 
to filers near the end of the tax-filing experience, 
after they learned the amount of their refunds. Each 
prompt appeared at the top of the web page, beside a 
small graphic depicting a piggy bank. The experiment 
included three treatment prompts and one comparison 
prompt:
Emergency prompt: “Do you have enough money 
for an emergency? A Harvard study found 
that most Americans could not come up with 
$2,000 for something unexpected. We can help 
you stay prepared.”
Family prompt: “Have a family or thinking of 
starting one? Start building a bright future for 
them.”
Future prompt: “Save for your future, and get 
peace of mind. Feel more secure about your 
future with a little extra money in the bank.”
Generic prompt: “Why not save a little money? 
you can split your federal refund into a savings 
account or get a U.S. Series 1 Savings Bond.”
Any effects of the treatment messages are relative 
to that of the Generic message (akin to treatment as 
usual), which also prompted tax filers to save. The 
treatment prompts differ from the generic prompt in 
that we integrated behavioral economics principles 
into their designs. Thus, importantly, any superiority 
of a treatment prompt over the control prompt is 
attributable to the implementation of behavioral 
economics techniques—not simply to the prompting 
to save. All three treatment messages prompt filers 
to consider a concrete reason for saving. Although 
the Future prompt is the most explicit of the three, 
all treatment messages prompt filers to consider the 
future. The Emergency message differs from the other 
treatment prompts in that it includes a social proof 
(Cialdini, 2006). The behavioral principle of social 
proof is included by prompting filers to think about 
how their situations compare with those of “most 
Americans.”
Anchoring, the other major behavioral mechanism 
tested in R2S, involves recommending a savings level to 
participants in treatment groups and prepopulating a 
field in the web form with that amount or percentage. 
The 2013 R2S experiment employed five anchors:
16 // WINTER 2015
1. 25% of the tax refund
2. 50% of the tax refund
3. 75% of the tax refund
4. $100
5. $250
The TTFE software presented a randomly assigned anchor 
to each refund recipient in one of the six treatment 
groups within each test period. Refund recipients in 
the control condition received no anchor. As Figure 1 
shows, TTFE presented the anchors directly below the 
prompt, and the prompt was set in green font so that it 
would stand out from the other text on the page. Filers 
assigned to treatment groups with dollar-amount anchors 
(i.e., $100 or $250) did not see a suggestion to save a 
percentage of the refund. 
Because savings bonds are available only in multiples 
of $50, TTFE rounded down the prepopulated savings 
amounts to the nearest $50. For example, a filer who 
was due a refund of $450 and assigned to a treatment 
group with a 50% anchor saw a suggested savings amount 
of $200: the amount remaining after 50% of the refund 
($225) is rounded down to the nearest increment of $50.4 
Because rounding has a proportionally greater effect on 
anchors for small refunds, analyses generally exclude 
participants with refunds of less than $250 (n = 82,352). 
Interventions consisted of different combinations of 
prompts and anchors (see Table 1). The interventions 
consisted of a single screen, which was integrated with 
essential functions of tax-filing software and which users 
could easily navigate in seconds or minutes.
DATA COLLECTION
TurboTax software data
Intuit created a completely anonymous set of data 
on all TTFE users receiving a refund and shared this 
4With rounding, the suggested amount is actually equiva-
lent to 44% of the $450 refund in the example. On aver-
age, the nominal anchor was 3.3% less than the actual 
one. Most tax filers (79%) saw a nominal anchor that was 
within 5% of the actual one.
Figure 1.  A screenshot within TurboTax Freedom Edition showing an Emergency prompt paired with a prepopulated savings sug-
gestion anchored at 25% of the tax refund.
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with the researchers for analysis. These TTFE data 
provide filing status (e.g., single or married and filing 
jointly), the number of dependents, age, income, tax 
credits and deductions claimed, and the amount of 
refund received. Because the data came directly from 
federal income tax returns, and there are potential 
financial or legal consequences for inaccurate filings, 
we assume they are highly accurate. The data set also 
indicates treatment status (assignment to the control 
group or to one of the treatments) and includes a 
measure of the outcome of highest interest: allocation 
of the refund. A filer could choose to receive the 
refund via electronic deposit or as a paper check. 
The entire refund could be sent to a single account 
(e.g., checking account) or divided (e.g., between 
checking and savings accounts, or between a paper 
check and Series I U.S. Savings Bond).5 The TTFE data 
capture (a) whether the participant deposited any of 
the refund into a savings vehicle (a savings account 
or savings bond); (b) whether the participant split 
the tax refund, allocating at least part of it to a 
savings vehicle; and (c) the portion—in dollars and as 
a percentage of the total refund—directed to a savings 
vehicle.
Longitudinal survey data
We supplemented TTFE data with information from 
two waves of the HFS, which enabled us to assess the 
impact of the R2S interventions over a 6-month period 
and to collect detailed information about the financial 
lives of LMI households. A link within TTFE invited 
experiment participants to complete the first wave of 
the survey (HFS1) immediately after they filed their 
taxes. We designed the HFS1 to take approximately 
5Internal Revenue Service Form 8888 underlies the op-
tion in the TTFE platform to split the refund across 
more than one account or vehicle.
20 minutes and allowed participants to skip questions. 
We collected the survey data via Qualtrics online 
software, obtained explicit consent from participants 
(pursuant to Title 26, Section 7216, of the Internal 
Revenue Code), and paired the data from the survey 
with that from the TTFE software.
We invited TTFE users to take the HFS1 if they filed a 
return on or after January 31 and received a federal 
tax refund. About half of the HFS1 questions focused 
on debts and assets. The responses provide information 
for household-level variables rather than for individual-
level ones. The survey asked respondents to report 
whether their households have specific types of debts 
and assets (see Tables 7 and 8). It also asked them to 
estimate the value of those obligations and holdings. If 
respondents did not answer the valuation question, a 
follow-up question asked them to choose from a list of 
value categories (i.e., $0, Less than $500, $501–$1,000, 
$1,001–$2,000, more than $2,000). Other survey 
sections focused on filers’ financial behaviors, such as 
budgeting strategies and the use of alternative financial 
services (e.g., payday loans), during the 12 months 
prior to the survey. Many HFS1 questions directly 
replicated previously validated survey instruments. 
For example, we drew upon the work of Lusardi et 
al. (2011, p. 88) for the following question: “How 
confident are you that you could come up with $2,000 
if an unexpected need arose within the next month?” 
In the HFS1 data set, one area of high interest is the 
information on intended use of tax refunds. The survey 
asked respondents about their plans for their refunds 
and instructed them to specify the expected allocation 
of the refund by giving the percentage earmarked for 
each of the following categories:
1. “Paying off debt you owe now”
2. “Spending in the next month or so on products, 
services, or regular bills like rent or utilities”
Period 1 (January 31–February 13) Period 2 (February 14–March 13) Period 3 (March 14–April 17)
Generic, no anchor (control) Generic, no anchor (control) Generic, no anchor (control)
generic, 25% generic, 50% Emergency, $100
generic, 50% generic, 75% Emergency, $250
Emergency, 25% Emergency, 50% Future, $100
Emergency, 50% Emergency, 75% Future, $250
Future, 25% Future, 75% Emergency, 25%
Family, 25% Family, 75% Future, 25%
Note: Generic, Emergency, Future, and Family indicate the prompts presented to filers via the in-product offer in TurboTax Freedom Edition. 
The percentages and dollar amounts indicate the suggested anchors.
Table 1. Combinations of Prompts and Anchors Tested in the Refund to Savings Experiment over Three Test Periods
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3. “Savings you expect to keep for a few months”
4. “Savings you expect to have this time next year”
5. “Savings for something further in the future”
To gather information about their actual use of the tax 
refunds, we subsequently e-mailed HFS1 respondents, 
inviting them to participate in a follow-up survey (HFS2) 
conducted 6 months after tax filing. To observe changes 
over time, the follow-up survey posed the same questions 
asked during the HFS1, but we added several items to 
capture household financial situations during those 6 
months. In addition to the questions from HFS1, the 
HFS2 asked respondents whether they moved, started 
a new job, or experienced any of several financial 
shocks: A household member experienced a period of 
unemployment, required a trip to the hospital, needed 
a major vehicle repair, or paid legal fees. The HFS2 also 
asked respondents what they did with their tax refunds. 
The allocation categories differ from those used in HFS1, 
and saving is collapsed into one category. Respondents to 
the HFS2 indicated the percentage of the refund allocated 
for each of the following purposes:
1. “Used to pay down debt”
2. “Spent within 1 month of receiving the refund”
3. “Spent after 1 month of receiving the refund”
4. “Saved and still have”
We followed this survey item with more specific 
questions about use of refunds. For example, we asked 
those who paid down debt to specify the types of debt 
they paid. Similarly, we asked those who spent part of 
their refund to identify the kinds of items purchased, 
and we included an open-ended “other” category. We 
also asked those who saved their refund what kind of 
accounts they saved in, and we offered the following 
response options: regular savings account, checking 
account, prepaid card, retirement account, education 
account, U.S. savings bonds, or other (the respondent 
could specify). Those who reported saving any portion 
of their refunds for 6 months were also asked what they 
saved for: emergencies or other unexpected needs, a 
special purchase, retirement or other long-term needs, 
children or grandchildren, or other.
An important element of the HFS2 is that it allows 
participants to define saving: The survey asked them to 
specify the percentage of the refund saved, regardless of 
where they saved it (e.g., holding refund money as cash 
or in a checking account). In contrast, the TTFE data use a 
more limited definition: Saving is a deposit into a savings 
account or a purchase of savings bonds as opposed to 
receipt of a mailed paper check or deposit into a checking 
account. One implication is that some participants 
identified as savers in HFS2 were not classified as savers 
according to the definition used in the TTFE data. As such, 
HFS2 provides a more accurate and complete picture of 
respondents’ actual tax-refund saving behaviors, which 
may have been influenced by prompts and anchors even 
if respondents did not choose to deposit their refunds 
into a savings account or to purchase savings bonds at tax 
time. The limited definition of saving in the TTFE data also 
may mean that the measured effects of the interventions 
understate the true impact. Conversely, the TTFE data may 
mistakenly identify participants as savers if they deposited 
the refund into savings at tax time but then transferred 
the money for other purposes. Data from HFS2 enable us to 
explore these possibilities.
We identified two main outcome measures of interest from 
the HFS2: whether participants saved any of their refunds 
for 6 months and the amount saved. We are interested 
in whether these outcomes differ by randomly assigned 
treatment conditions.
One caveat is that HFS data were self-reported, and the 
survey included several questions that may have been 
difficult to answer accurately. However, a comparison of 
data from the TTFE and the two waves of the HFS suggests 
that the self-reported HFS responses are highly reliable. 
For example, even 6 months after filing their taxes, 
respondents’ self-reports of tax refund amounts correlated 
with the refund amounts in the TTFE data (r = .95, p < 
.001).
We cannot determine how accurately responses reflect 
reality. Unless participants kept tax-refund savings separate 
Summary of savings outcome measures
TTFE data: Tax-time savings deposits
• Whether filers deposited any of the tax
refund to a savings vehicle
• Whether filers split the tax refund to a
savings vehicle
• Dollar amounts deposited to a savings
vehicle
HFS2 data: 6-month savings
• Whether survey respondents reported 
that they “saved, and still have” any
refund (note: not necessarily in savings
vehicle)
• Percentage of the refund that they
reported they “saved, and still have”
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from other savings and income, they may have been unable 
to determine at the HFS2 how much of the refunds they 
used for spending, saving, and debt repayment. Therefore, 
we consider the response to the question about the saved 
amount to be largely perceptual. 
We also can examine measures of holdings (i.e., assets and 
liabilities, and calculated liquid assets and net worth) and 
changes over time, but we observed large, unexpected 
fluctuations between the time of filing and the HFS2. As 
such, we focus on the self-reported use of tax refunds.
ANALySIS
Analysis of TTFE data is relatively straightforward: 
We can largely ignore issues related to selection bias 
and mitigating financial factors, because there was no 
opportunity for self-selection into the R2S experiment, 
and financial factors are equally distributed across 
groups via randomization. We also can be confident 
that the outcomes observed among treatment groups 
resulted from the exposure of those groups to the 
respective treatments. Descriptive comparisons of 
treatment-group characteristics confirm that the random 
assignment effectively generated roughly equivalent 
groups. Simple t-tests are sufficient to compare outcome 
means and proportions among treatment groups. In 
general, we believe that findings from TTFE data can be 
generalized to the LMI taxpayer population in the United 
States; however, we recognize that the sample may 
disproportionately represent individuals who file their 
own taxes and are Internet savvy.
Variation in tax filers’ characteristics by the timing 
of filing (i.e., when they filed during the tax season) 
complicates analysis. For example, people who file early 
in the tax season have significantly larger refunds, claim 
more dependents, and are more likely to file as head 
of household. Thus, we cannot compare outcomes of 
interventions across test periods without controlling for 
filing date.
Because we cannot assume that HFS respondents are 
selected randomly, analysis of HFS data—especially data 
from the HFS2—required a different empirical approach 
than the one employed in analysis of the TTFE data. 
Respondents to the two waves of the HFS differ from 
the TTFE population in several observable ways. For 
example, HFS respondents are somewhat older and more 
likely to be married. Of greater concern is the possibility 
that unobserved factors influence the likelihood of 
participating in the HFS. As a result, we generally refrain 
from using HFS data to make assumptions about the TTFE 
population. However, we compared participants within 
each test period and observed no differences in HFS 
response rates across treatment conditions. We therefore 
can confidently measure treatment effects within the HFS 
subsample.
The HFS subsample is considerably smaller than the 
TTFE population. To maximize the sizes of comparison 
groups, we combined interventions with the same 
prompt or anchor in some models, rather than examining 
each specific intervention combination. For example, 
some models estimated the influence of anchor levels 
on savings outcomes but disregarded prompts. Others 
estimated the effects of the different prompts but 
ignored the anchor level. Findings from analysis of the 
2012 TTFE data reveal that anchors are more effective 
than prompts in increasing the amounts of deposits to 
savings vehicles and that prompts are not associated with 
savings differences (Grinstein-Weiss, Gale, et al., 2014). 
Because we identified the anchor as the main mechanism 
for determining the level of tax-time saving, we can 
restrict HFS2 data analyses to focus on examining the 
marginal effects of anchor levels on saving behaviors in 
the 6 months between filing and the HFS2.
We used multiple regression techniques to control for 
many factors that may affect outcomes and to improve 
overall model fit; we selected these covariates on a 
model-by-model basis. We generally incorporated factors 
that may explain saving behaviors after tax time. Most 
models accounted for participant’s age, number of 
dependents, and tax refund amounts. When we analyzed 
data from the entire experiment’s sample, rather than 
from respondents who filed during a single test period, 
we included the filing date as a covariate. Sample 
sizes vary slightly from one analysis to another because 
of listwise exclusion of cases when data are missing. 
Because anchors were rounded down to the nearest $50 
increment, we also employed a covariate to account for 
the difference between the nominal and actual anchors. 
In models that estimated the effects of anchors, we used 
this covariate to account for the potential downward 
bias of instances in which the actual and nominal anchors 
differ. If level of debt or assets was the outcome of 
interest, we included other predictors (e.g., level of 
education and race).
We based regression models on the outcome of interest. 
We employed ordinary least squares regression to 
estimate continuous outcome variables (e.g., the amount 
deposited into a savings account) and logistic regression 
to estimate binary outcome variables (e.g., whether a 
participant saved any of the refund).
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All TurboTax Freedom Edition
tax filers who received a refund
Participated in HFS1 
Included in descriptive analyses 
Participated in HFS1
Included in descriptive analyses
Participated in HFS2
Sample for analysis of sustained
effects of R2S 
Included in descriptive analyses
Participated in HFS2
Excluded from R2S analysis†
Included in descriptive analyses
Randomized in R2S
Viewed anchor-prompt combination
Sample for analysis of tax-time 
effects of R2S
Not randomized*
Excluded from R2S analysis
HFS1 total n = 20,816
HFS2 total n = 8,484
(n = 873,026)
(n = 680,545) (n = 192,481)
(n = 12,809) (n = 8,007)
(n = 4,940) (n = 3,544)
Figure 2. Overview of participant recruitment and inclusion in analyses. Note: R2S = Refund to 
Savings experiment; HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial 
Survey, second wave.
*Those who submitted their taxes to the IRS before January 31, 2013, or who began filing in a 
different TurboTax product before using TurboTax Freedom Edition were not randomized.
†The number of HFS participants excluded from the analysis of the R2S experiment includes those 
who were not randomized as well as those who may have been randomized but whose consenting 
names did not match the IRS record. The absence of a match between the consenting name and 
the record rendered their randomized assignment unknown to the researchers.
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IV. pARTICIpANT ChARACTERISTICS
As we have mentioned above, the 2013 R2S initiative 
involved data collected at three points: during TTFE 
filing, during the HFS1 immediately after tax filing, 
and during the HFS2 conducted 6 months later. During 
the TTFE phase of data collection, 873,026 individuals 
filed returns through the TTFE program and were due 
a tax refund. The analytical sample, which excludes 
individuals who were not randomly assigned to one 
of the experimental conditions, consists of 680,545 
participants. For an overview of the acquisition of the 
analytical sample, see Figure 2. As Table 2 suggests, the 
analytical sample closely resembles the full population 
of 873,026 TTFE filers on most observed measures.
Most filers who contributed TTFE data (95%) qualified 
to use the free software by having an adjusted gross 
income of less than $31,000; however, 4.5% qualified 
by claiming the EITC (the adjusted gross income 
of these filers was higher than $31,000), and only 
0.4% qualified through active-duty military service. 
It should be noted that the average income of TTFE 
filers receiving refunds (and that of R2S participants) 
was less than $15,000. That is significantly lower 
than the maximum income threshold ($31,000) 
specified in TTFE eligibility criteria. As Table 2 
shows, the average age of TTFE filers was about 
34 years. Roughly two thirds of participants filed 
with a household status of single, 21% filed as 
head of household, and 10% filed jointly with their 
spouse as a married couple. Twenty-nine percent of 
participants in the TTFE data claimed a dependent 
on their tax return, and the average federal income-
tax refund was $1,833 (see Illustration 1). 
Assessed population
Analytical Sample  
(in R2S experiment)
Characteristic TTFE HFS1 HFS2 TTFE HFS1 HFS2
N 873,026 20,816 8,484 680,545 12,809 4,940
Age in years 34.1 36.1 35.2 34.0 36.4 35.5
(15.4) (14.1) (13.2) (15.7) (14.7) (13.8)
Gender (% female) NA 60.6 61.3 NA 58.9 59.8
Filing status
% single 66.1 63.5 63.9 68.4 68.3 69.7
% head of household 22.5 20.8 19.3 20.8 17.8 15.5
% married filing jointly 10.4 14.9 15.9 9.9 13.1 14.0
% current student NA 27.3 27.1 NA 28.2 27.8
% college educated NA 43.0 49.9 NA 43.2 51.0
% non-White race NA 21.3 20.2 NA 19.4 18.0
% Hispanic ethnicity NA 8.0 7.8 NA 8.2 8.1
% claiming dependents 31.6 33.3 33.0 29.1 28.1 26.9
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,819 16,546 17,520 14,378 15,666 16,634
(9,739) (10,208) (10,174) (9,600) (10,001) (9,968)
Federal tax refund ($) 1,964 2,105 2,179 1,833 1,835 1,875
(2,389) (2,305) (2,333) (2,332) (2,114) (2,117)
Note: IPO = in-product offer; HFS = Household Financial Survey; R2S = Refund to Savings experiment; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition; HFS1 
= Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave; NA = demographic characteristics are not collected 
with tax data. Unless otherwise specified, values are means with standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics from the Experimental, Tax (TTFE), and HFS Data
Illustration 1.  Characteristics of R2S participants. Values in top 
row are medians.
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After filing their taxes, 20,816 TTFE users responded 
to an invitation to take the HFS1. Of these, 18,839 
(92%) could be matched to the TTFE data.6 A high 
proportion (91%) of people who began the HFS1 finished 
it. The entire survey took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete (20 minutes was the median). Overall, the 
demographic characteristics of the two HFS subsamples 
(participants who completed only HFS1 and those who 
completed both waves; see Table 2) are very similar 
to each other and to the full TTFE population. This 
indicates that selection bias is limited. For the first 3 
days of the tax season, the R2S team offered filers a 
$20 incentive to take the HFS1. Thus, response rates 
to the survey were higher during that time (about 10% 
with the incentive vs. 1.2% without). We discontinued 
the incentive because the response exceeded our 
expectations and limited resources.
Six months after completing the HFS1, the R2S team 
invited 17,952 individuals to participate in the HFS2. Of 
those invited, 8,659 clicked the e-mailed link to take 
the survey (48% response rate), and 8,251 (95%) of those 
who responded to the invitation completed the HFS2. 
The average time elapsed between HFS1 and HFS2 was 
6 months and 9 days (SD = 9 days). The response rate 
helps ensure that the HFS2 subsample is demographically 
comparable with the HFS1 subsample. Also, the 
experimental groups in the HFS2 did not differ within test 
period on any demographic characteristic. This indicates 
that group equivalence generated by randomization was 
retained and the ability to attribute differences to the 
intervention holds at the 6-month point. We offered a 
$20 incentive to those HFS2 participants who received an 
incentive for completing the HFS1 and $5 or $15 to HFS2 
participants who received no previous incentive from R2S. 
 Compared with the subsample of filers who completed 
the HFS1, the HFS2 subsample was younger, had higher 
income, and reported higher educational attainment. The 
demographic traits of the two subsamples are otherwise 
very similar (see Table 2 for a summary of descriptive 
characteristics).
TAX-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
Among TTFE filers receiving a refund, only 4% itemized 
their tax return; in comparison, about one third of 
all filers in the United States submit itemized returns 
6 Names of survey participants granting consent were 
required to exactly match names on tax forms in or-
der for Intuit to share the data with researchers at 
the Center for Social Development. For example, if a 
filer consented under a married surname but a maiden 
surname was on the tax record, the names would not 
match and data could not be shared.
(Internal Revenue Service, 2014b). About half of TTFE 
filers (54%) had no federal tax liability in 2012; the 
average tax liability among those with any was $918, 
and the median was $708. Most TTFE filers in this 
sample (93%) had taxes withheld via payroll deductions. 
The mean amount withheld was $1,122 in 2012, and the 
median was $758. 
The EITC is an important policy that benefits many LMI 
filers; it is worth noting that 93% of refund-receiving 
TTFE filers reported earned income but that 59% did 
not qualify for the EITC. Our analysis of the TTFE data 
suggests that the EITC’s age requirements are the most 
common reason why filers without dependents were 
ineligible to receive the credit. A filer claiming no 
dependent was eligible to receive the EITC in 2013 if 
he or she was between the ages of 25 and 65 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2013b). Among wage earners in 
the TTFE sample who did not receive the EITC (n = 
477,398), 60% did not qualify because they were under 
age 25, and an additional 3% did not qualify because 
they were older than age 65. Income criteria excluded 
23% of wage earners in this group.
The median EITC received by those who qualified was 
$2,142, and the mean was $2,191. Among TTFE filers 
who received any EITC, the credit makes up two thirds 
of the total federal tax refund. On average, the refund 
for those who received the EITC was more than 4.5 
times higher than the refund for people who did not 
receive the credit ($882 vs. $3,498).
HOW DO R2S PARTICIPANTS COMPARE WITH THE U.S. 
POPULATION?
Perhaps because filing taxes online requires technical 
savvy, participants in the R2S experiment and the HFS 
tended to be younger and better educated than the 
general U.S. population. They also were more likely to 
be students. The median age of TTFE filers receiving a 
refund was 28 years in 2013, while the median age of 
U.S. taxpayers was about 45 (Internal Revenue Service, 
2014b, pp. 77–78, Table 1.6). More than a quarter of 
HFS respondents indicated that they were enrolled 
students, but the rate of enrollment is only about 9% 
for the U.S. adult population.7 Compared with the 
general population of filers in the United States, HFS 
participants and TTFE users were also more likely to 
file as single and less likely to file as married filing 
jointly (Internal Revenue Service, 2014b). The racial 
makeup of HFS participants is similar to that of the 
7 Estimated from the count of students enrolled in post-
secondary institutions in 2012 (National Center for Ed-
ucation Statistics, 2013) and from the total U.S. adult 
population in 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).
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general population in the United States: 21% of HFS 
participants identify themselves as non-White, and non-
Whites comprise 22% of the U.S. population. Hispanic 
ethnicity is underrepresented in the HFS subsample: 
8% of participants vs. 17% of the U.S. population (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013). In our study (TTFE data and HFS 
data), the proportion of households with dependents 
was about the same as the proportion of tax-filing 
households claiming dependents in the U.S. population 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2014a). Because use of TTFE 
is limited to filers who have low or moderate income, 
the median adjusted gross income of R2S participants 
was much lower than the U.S. median ($13,104 versus 
$36,055 for the U.S. population in 2012; Internal 
Revenue Service, 2014b, p. 27, Table 1.1). Similarly, 
the average tax refund of R2S participants ($1,833) was 
smaller than the U.S. average ($2,755) in 2013 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2013a).
DIFFERENCES By FILINg DATE
Tax-preparation experts have long recognized that two 
surges of tax-filing activity occur during the tax season, 
and they often refer to two “peaks.” Early (Peak 1) 
filers are thought to be eager to get their refunds 
as soon as possible, and late-season (Peak 2) filers 
are generally believed to be less eager to get their 
refund or are considered procrastinators. Examination 
of our sample’s characteristics by filing date reveals 
trends that are important to consider in analyses 
and in the design of future studies. We found that 
several traits changed in a gradual way during the tax 
season and were not associated with discreet groups 
or peak activity. For example, adjusted gross income, 
refund amount, rate of depositing, and dollar amount 
deposited into a savings vehicle were all highest early 
in the season and decreased over time (see, e.g., 
Figure 3).
People filing on the first day of the tax season received 
refunds that, on average, were three times larger 
than those received by people who filed on the April 
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Figure 3. Mean federal refund varies by date filing began (n = 
853,674).
15 deadline. Some variance in characteristics is even 
apparent by day of the week: Intraweek peaks in the 
mean refund amount occurred mid-week, and troughs 
occurred on weekends. These findings informed our 
analyses: Because the filers differ over time, we 
generally refrain from comparing the effects of the 
R2S intervention across the three test periods. If we 
do make comparisons across the periods, we try to 
account for differences in filer characteristics over time 
by including filing date as a covariate in regressions. 
See Table 3 for a summary of characteristics by test 
period.
Age
% Filing  
single
% Claiming 
dependents
gross income Federal tax refund
Periods N Mean SD Mean ($) SD Mean ($) SD
Period 1 259,429 34.4 14.7 57.1 41.9 16,249 9,590 2,492 2,563
Period 2 207,215 34.0 16.2 68.9 28.3 14,460 9,561 1,785 2,496
Period 3 213,901 33.5 16.5 81.5 14.5 12,675 9,427 1,080 1,484
All participants 680,515 34.0 15.7 68.4 29.1 14,581 9,645 1,833 2,332
Note: Periods refer to the dates on which filing began in TurboTax Freedom Edition. Period 1 is January 31–February 13, Period 2 is February 
14–March 13, and Period 3 is March 14–April 17. The 2013 tax season began on January 31, 2013 and ended on April 17, 2013.
Table 3. Participant Characteristics Vary by Test Period
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part Two
Research Findings: The Experiment
By employing a rigorous, randomized controlled design and principles of behavioral 
economics, the R2S experiment seeks to test interventions that encourage tax filers to save 
some of their refunds. In this section, we present results from the R2S experiment. Key 
outcomes include deposits to savings vehicles at tax time and participants’ uses of the tax 
refund in the subsequent 6 months.
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V. ImpACT OF R2S AT TAx TImE
Data from the 2013 R2S experiment demonstrate 
that the low-touch behavioral economics techniques 
used in these interventions increase deposits into 
savings vehicles. Results from analysis of several 
outcome measures in the TTFE data set indicate that 
saving behaviors increase with exposure to behavioral 
interventions (i.e., to a combination of anchoring to 
specific saving amounts and motivational prompts).
CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TECHNIQUES INCREASE 
SAVINgS DEPOSITS AT TAX TIME?
Both anchors and prompts can 
increase savings deposits.
Overall, 7.6% of filers in the R2S treatment groups 
deposited tax refunds into a savings vehicle, and 6.8% of 
filers in the control group made such deposits. Although 
the increase attributable to treatment exposure is 
modest if measured as a percentage of the behavior 
of this very large sample, the difference in saving 
rates translates to a 12.1% increase in the number of 
individuals who deposited to savings after exposure to 
an R2S intervention. That is equivalent to an increase of 
about 4,800 savers (Illustration 2).
We began analysis of the data by examining the 
respective impacts of individual combinations of 
anchors and prompts (Figure 4). In Periods 1 and 2, 
the proportion of filers who deposited any tax refund 
into a savings vehicle was statistically higher in every 
treatment condition than in the control group (Figures 
4A and 4B). The interventions tested in Period 3—when 
overall savings deposits were lower—appear to have 
had less of an effect, yet the combination of the Future 
prompt with a dollar-amount anchor ($100 or $250) 
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the 
proportion of participants who deposited any of their 
refunds into savings (Figure 4C).
We also examined deposits across the three test periods, 
combining groups anchored to the same percentage or 
dollar amount. As Figure 5 illustrates, the proportion 
of filers depositing refunds to savings vehicles is 
Figure 4. Percentages of participants who deposited any 
refund into savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers 
exclude tax filers who opted for paper check and those with 
federal refunds less than $250.
aParticipants in the control condition were exposed to a 
Generic prompt and no anchor.
* statistically different from control group at the 95% confidence 
level; ** statistically different from control group at the 99% 
confidence level.
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Illustration 2.  The R2S impact on number of savers.
4,800
more individuals deposited
into a savings vehicle as 
a result of the R2S
interventions
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statistically higher if any anchor is present than if there 
is no anchor. Similarly, if participants are grouped across 
the three test periods according to the type of prompt, 
the proportion of filers who deposited some of their 
refund in a savings vehicle is greater among those who 
received the Emergency and Future prompts than among 
counterparts who received the generic prompt shown to 
members of the control group (Figure 6).
CAN R2S EFFECTIVELy ENCOURAgE PEOPLE TO SPLIT 
THEIR REFUNDS?
The interventions approximately 
double the rate of splitting.
Federal policy and electronic filing platforms enable 
taxpayers to split their refund by directing the treasury to 
disburse it to multiple accounts or savings vehicles. Our 
analysis shows that the intervention nearly doubles the 
rate of refund splitting (including allocation to at least one 
savings vehicle): 0.86% of the control group and 1.55% of 
the treatment groups split their refunds to allocate some 
to a savings vehicle. Consistent with the results presented 
above, the effect of the interventions is stronger in the 
first two test periods than in Period 3 (Figures 7A-7C). 
Although refund splitting is uncommon in all conditions, 
the R2S interventions specifically prompted filers to 
split, and the observed increase in the targeted behavior 
suggests that low-touch techniques can influence tax-time 
choices as intended.
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Figure 6. Probability of depositing any refund into savings 
vehicle at tax time by prompt message, based on regression 
estimates (n = 468,985). 
* statistically different from Generic prompt group at the 95% 
confidence level; ** statistically different from control group at the 
99% confidence level.
Figure 7. Percentages of participants who split any refunds into 
savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers exclude tax filers 
who opted for paper check and those with federal refunds less 
than $250.
aParticipants in the control condition were exposed to a Generic 
prompt and no anchor.
* statistically different from control group at the 99% confidence 
level.
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of the Future prompt with the $100 anchor produced 
a significantly higher deposit amount than that for 
the control group (Figure 8C). We estimate that filers 
deposited an additional $6 million into savings vehicles 
as a result of the R2S interventions (Illustration 3).
We also examined deposit amounts across the tax 
season, using ordinary least squares regression to 
control for other factors. In results from analysis of all 
deposits made by participants with the same anchor, 
the estimated deposit amounts for all anchor groups 
DOES R2S INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
DEPOSITINg THEIR WHoLE REFUND INTO SAVINgS?
The Emergency prompt shows promise 
in encouraging people to save 
the whole refund.
Some combinations of prompt messages and anchors 
affect the percentage of filers who save their entire 
refund. In Periods 1 and 2, the proportion of people who 
deposited their whole refund is statistically significantly 
greater among participants who received the Emergency 
prompt than among control-group members, who 
received the generic prompt and no anchor. Those 
in the Emergency prompt conditions anchored at 25% 
and 50% deposited the whole refund at rates of 7.9% 
and 7.8%, respectively; 7.3% of those in the control 
condition deposited the whole refund (p <.01). In Period 
3, however, the likelihood of saving the whole refund 
was no greater among treatment participants than 
among participants in the control condition. Because 
the interventions encouraged participants to save by 
splitting the refund, observed effects on rates of saving 
the whole refund suggest that receptiveness to savings 
messages may be independent of the recommendation 
to split.
DOES R2S INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF MONEy DEPOSITED 
INTO SAVINgS AT TAX TIME?
The 2013 R2S interventions significantly 
increased total deposits to savings.
In addition to their effects on the proportion of 
participants saving, the 2013 R2S interventions also 
positively affect the dollar amounts saved. An analysis 
of the effects of specific combinations of messages 
and anchors on the amount deposited shows that, in 
Periods 1 and 2, the deposit amounts for all but one 
combination are significantly higher than that for the 
control condition (Figures 8A and 8B). The exception is 
the combination of the Family prompt with an anchor 
at 25%. In Period 3, however, only the combination 
Illustration 3.  The impact of R2S on the dollar amount saved.
Figure 8. Average dollar amounts of refunds deposited into 
savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers exclude tax 
filers who opted for paper check and those with federal refunds 
less than $250.
aParticipants in the control condition were exposed to a 
Generic prompt and no anchor.
* statistically different from control group at the 95% confidence 
level; ** statistically different from control group at the 99% 
confidence level.
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are higher than the amount deposited by the control 
group, which was not shown an anchor (Figure 9).
We employed a similar technique to examine the 
effects of the motivational prompts on the amount 
of refunds deposited across the tax season. Overall, 
the amount deposited by participants exposed to the 
Emergency prompt was significantly greater than that 
deposited by members of the control group, which 
received the Generic prompt (Figure 10); however, the 
effect sizes for the prompts appear to be much smaller 
than those for anchors.
DOES R2S INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PAPER-CHECK 
RECIPIENTS PURCHASINg BONDS?
Certain anchors double the rate of bond purchases.
The use of anchoring to suggest a savings amount for 
filers who opt to receive their tax refund as a paper 
check significantly increases the probability that they 
will purchase savings bonds. Although purchasing bonds 
is a rare behavior, filers anchored at 25% or 50% of the 
refund (i.e., shown a suggestion that they should save 
25% or 50% of their refund) are more than twice as 
likely as control-group members to purchase savings 
bonds: Bonds were purchased by 0.70% of treatment 
participants shown a 25% anchor, by 0.62% of those 
shown a 50% anchor, and by 0.27% of control-group 
participants (z = 4.85 for 25%; z = 3.89 for 50%; p < 
.001). Unlike anchors, however, the savings prompt 
messages do not significantly increase the rate or 
amount saved among those who chose to receive 
refunds via paper checks.
Figure 9. Dollar amount deposited into savings vehicle at tax 
time by anchor amount, based on regression estimates (n = 
468,947). 
* statistically different from no anchor group at 90% confidence 
level; ** statistically different from the control group at 95% 
confidence level.
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time by prompt message, based on regression estimates (n = 
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VI. ThE ImpACT OF R2S 6 mONThS 
AFTER FIlING
Using data from the 6-month follow up (HFS2), we 
are able to test for sustained effects of the R2S 
interventions. The main outcome of interest here is 
not where the tax refund is deposited (a key concern 
in our analyses with the TTFE data) but rather whether 
the filer had any of that refund left after 6 months 
and, if so, how much remained. The primary outcome 
data come from a question about the percentage of 
the refund allocated for (a) spending within a month, 
(b) spending after 1 month but before 6 months, (c) 
debt payments, and (d) savings. In contrast with the 
relatively restricted measure of saving at tax time 
(defined by allocation of refunds at that point), the 
measure of saving in the HFS2 captures respondents’ 
perceptions of their own savings, which could include 
funds held in checking accounts, in cash, or in a 
traditional savings vehicle. This broad, respondent-
determined definition of savings enables us to test 
of whether the R2S interventions influenced saving 
behavior and outcomes beyond the time of filing.
DOES R2S INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO SAVE 
THEIR REFUND FOR 6 MONTHS?
Higher anchors result in a greater chance of saving.
Figure 11 illustrates results from a logistic regression 
that examined the effects of the R2S interventions 
on the rate at which participants save refunds for 6 
months. For this analysis, we collapsed groups with 
common anchor percentages or amounts, regardless 
of filing date. The results suggest that the likelihood 
of saving a portion of the refund for 6 months is 
significantly higher among filers shown the 50% anchor 
than among filers in the control group, which had 
no anchor. The average control-group participant is 
estimated to have a 25.9% probability of reporting 
that he or she saved part of the refund for 6 months, 
yet treatment participants shown a 50% anchor are 
estimated to have a 30.6% probability of saving a 
portion for that time (p = .06). The probability is 
also about 30% among those assigned to a group 
shown a 75% anchor, although the standard error is 
larger for this group, and the difference from the 
control group is not statistically significant. Figure 12 
illustrates results from a similar analysis conducted to 
evaluate the effects of prompts instead of anchors. If 
participants are grouped by prompt and not by filing 
date, the likelihood of saving a portion of the refund 
for 6 months does not significantly differ by treatment 
condition: Participants shown a treatment prompt 
are no more likely to save than are control-group 
participants, who received the generic message.
CAN R2S INCREASE THE PROPORTION OF THE REFUND 
STILL IN SAVINgS AFTER 6 MONTHS?
The 75% anchor increases the proportion 
in savings after 6 months.
To determine what proportion of refunds remained in 
savings at the HFS2, we estimated an ordinary least 
squares regression that controlled for several factors. 
The results suggest that, compared with participants 
in the control group, participants shown the 75% 
anchor saved a significantly greater proportion of their 
refunds for 6 months (Figure 13). Six months after 
filing, the control group still had slightly less than 15% 
of their refunds, but the group shown the 75% anchor 
had over 19%. The proportions saved by participants 
in groups shown other anchor levels do not differ 
significantly from those saved by the control group. 
We also estimated a regression that assessed whether 
the percentage of the refund remaining in savings 
varies by the prompt shown to participants, but we 
found no significant differences (Figure 14).
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Figure 11. Probability of saving refund for 6 months by anchor 
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,172). 
* statistically different from no anchor group at 90% confidence 
level.
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Figure 12. Probability of saving for 6 months by prompt, based 
on regression estimates (n = 4,172).
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Figure 13. Percentage of refund saved for 6 months by anchor 
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,833). 
* statistically different from control group at 90% confidence 
level.
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Figure 14. Percentage of refund saved for 6 months by prompt, 
based on regression estimates (n = 4,833).
DOES R2S AFFECT PERCEPTIONS OF THE ABILITy TO 
COME UP WITH $2,000?
Some interventions increase perceptions 
of access to emergency funds.
Our research suggests that R2S interventions also 
influence participants’ perceptions of their ability to 
access $2,000 in an emergency. At tax time (HFS1) 
and again 6 months later (HFS2), we asked whether 
the participant could “come up with $2,000 if an 
unexpected need arose within the next month” 
(Lusardi et al., 2011, p. 88). Respondents could 
select that they were certain they could, that they 
could probably, that they probably could not, or 
that they were certain they could not come up with 
$2,000. Figure 15 presents the predicted probability 
that a respondent certainly or probably could access 
$2,000. It shows estimated probabilities by anchor 
levels for each wave of the HFS. The results indicate 
that, at both points in time, participants shown a 
50% or 75% anchor were significantly more likely than 
control-group members to answer affirmatively (p < 
.001). Those shown a $250 anchor were significantly 
more likely than control-group members to answer 
affirmatively at the 6-month follow-up survey (p < 
.05). One interesting takeaway from these data is that 
the increased confidence in access to emergency funds 
occurred at the time of filing, even before the tax 
refund would have been received. It is possible that 
the interventions primed participants to think about 
alternative sources of emergency funds. It is also 
possible that the interventions primed them to give a 
socially optimal answer but did not necessarily change 
the material conditions. It is interesting to note that 
the estimated changes in perceptions persisted for at 
least 6 months.
Figure 16 presents estimates from regressions 
predicting the probability of an affirmative response 
to the question on access to $2,000 for each wave 
of the HFS and for each prompt. Participants shown 
an Emergency prompt were more likely than control-
group members to report at HFS1 that they had $2,000 
for an emergency. Those shown a Family prompt were 
more likely than control-group counterparts to report 
this at HFS2. The statistically significant finding for the 
Emergency prompt is particularly interesting because 
the wording of the prompt specifically references the 
ability to come up with $2,000: “A Harvard study found 
that most Americans could not come up with $2,000 
for something unexpected. We can help you stay 
prepared.” By explicitly referencing the $2,000 level 
and indicating that “most Americans” cannot access 
that amount, we may have prompted a psychological 
reaction rather than a behavioral one.
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Figure 15. Percentage of survey respondents who say they 
could come up with $2,000 in an emergency by anchor 
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,727). Note: 
HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = 
Household Financial Survey, second wave. 
* statistically different from control group at 95% confidence 
level; ** statistically different from no anchor group at 90% 
confidence level.
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SUMMARy OF RESULTS FROM THE 2013 R2S EXPERIMENT
In the 2013 R2S experiment, we evaluated the 
effectiveness of combining suggested savings amounts 
(anchors) with messages that were informed by the 
principles of behavioral economics, that prompted tax 
filers to split their tax refunds, and that encouraged 
them to allocate a portion into savings vehicles. 
To examine the effects of these interventions, we 
compared participants in carefully designed treatment 
conditions with counterparts in a control group, 
which we exposed to a generic savings-promotion 
message but not to an anchor. Our estimates show 
that exposure to the R2S interventions increased the 
number of savers, the number of people splitting the 
refund into savings, and the amount deposited into 
savings vehicles at tax time. However, the magnitude 
of effects on saving behavior varies by the timing of 
filing. In general, the magnitude of effects is greater 
among participants who filed in Period 1 or Period 2 
than among those who filed in Period 3; however, the 
R2S team did not test the two high-percentage anchors 
(50% and 75%) in Period 3, so it is possible that other 
anchor–prompt combinations would have been more 
effective. In addition, data from the HFS provide 
evidence concerning the impact of the interventions 
over time. We estimate that high anchoring (50% or 
75%) is associated with an increase in the probability 
of saving as well as with the percentage of the refund 
remaining in savings after 6 months. Observed long-
term effects of minor design changes in the electronic 
filing software are noteworthy and hold promise for 
scalable impact on savings in LMI households.
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Figure 16. Percentage of respondents who say they could 
come up with $2,000 in an Emergency by prompt, based on 
regression estimates (n = 4,727). Note: HFS1 = Household 
Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial 
Survey, second wave. 
* statistically different from the control group at 95% confidence 
level; ** statistically different from Generic prompt group at 
90% confidence level.
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part Three
Research Findings: Descriptive Results
Data from the TTFE software and HFS enable this research to extend beyond the research 
questions that this experiment set out to answer. These data offer an in-depth look at the 
preferences, behavior, and financial well-being of LMI households. In this section, we present 
valuable insights revealed by exploratory analyses. Particularly noteworthy are results from 
investigations of the roles that the characteristics of tax filers play in saving and the inability 
to save. For each topic, we present results from the largest sample available: In general, 
tax-related characteristics come from the entire available TTFE data set (i.e., all TTFE filers 
receiving refunds, including those not participating in the R2S experiment), characteristics 
assessed by survey come from the HFS1 subsample, and the HFS2 is the source for measures 
of events occurring in the 6-months following tax filing.
36 // WINTER 2015
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 37
VII. RECEIpT AND UTIlIzATION OF 
TAx REFUNDS
In the TurboTax filing experience, after submitting all 
information relevant to income, credits, and deductions, 
filers owed a tax refund are shown options for receiving 
the refund. They may choose to receive refunds via direct 
deposit, paper check, or U.S. savings bonds. The user may 
opt to divide the tax refund between two bank accounts, 
between a bank account and a bond purchase, or between 
a paper check and a bond purchase. This end-of-filing 
experience is the setting for the R2S experiment, wherein 
we encourage filers to divide the tax refund and deposit a 
portion into a savings vehicle.
DIRECT DEPOSIT VERSUS PAPER CHECK
Filers with small refunds are more 
likely to opt for a paper check.
Most TTFE filers (83%) opt to receive at least part of their 
refund through direct deposit. In the TTFE data, refunds 
deposited into prepaid debit-card accounts are not 
distinguishable from those deposited into other types of 
accounts, but our analysis of data from the HFS1 shows that 
2% of filers who chose direct deposit self-reported that they 
sent their refund deposit to a prepaid debit account. The 
TTFE data indicate that 17% of TTFE filers chose to receive 
at least part of their refund via a paper check sent in the 
mail.
Some evidence shows that filing date is tied to participants’ 
choices concerning refund payment. The probability of 
choosing a paper check increases as the filing deadline 
nears: 12% of filers chose to receive a paper check in Period 
1, 17% chose this in Period 2, and 27% chose it in Period 3. 
We find additional evidence for this relationship in results 
from a logistic regression (results not shown), which also 
indicate that lacking a bank account, being unemployed, and 
lacking a college education are associated with the choice of 
a paper check. The odds of choosing a paper check decrease 
as gross income and federal tax-refund size increase. 
Furthermore, after adjusting for these variables, we found 
that the probability of choosing a paper check is significantly 
lower among females than among males and significantly 
lower among African Americans than among Whites.
Tax filers who wish to direct deposit may only deposit 
to existing accounts. Notably, however, 5.6% of HFS1 
respondents reported having no checking or savings account. 
Encouraging the use of direct deposit and enabling filers 
to open bank accounts at the time of tax filing have the 
potential to speed up receipt of refunds, reduce the number 
of unbanked filers, foster engagement with financial 
institutions, and move funds directly into savings containers. 
The Internal Revenue Service has also expressed interest 
in decreasing the number of paper-check refunds because 
direct deposit eliminates problems with lost, stolen, or 
undeliverable checks (Internal Revenue Service, 2008). 
Understanding the characteristics of people who are most 
likely to choose paper checks may inform strategies to boost 
use of direct deposit.
BONDS
Awareness of bonds is high, but usage is low.
Take-up of U.S. savings bonds was low at tax time: Only 
0.3% of TTFE filers (n = 2,937) purchased bonds with their 
refunds. The HFS2 asked participants: “Are you familiar 
with U.S. savings bonds?” Fifty-eight percent of respondents 
said, “Yes,” and an additional 34% indicated, “Sort of, I have 
heard of them, but do not know details.” Only 8% of HFS2 
respondents indicated a lack of familiarity with bonds (“No, 
I have no idea”). These results suggest that the infrequency 
of bond purchases is probably not due to lack of awareness. 
Among HFS2 respondents who purchased bonds with their 
refunds (n = 128), about half (47%) indicated that they “just 
wanted to put some money away,” 34% were “saving for the 
future of [their] children,” 16% were saving “for retirement 
or other long-term needs,” and 3.9% were saving “for 
emergencies and other short-term needs.” Most purchased 
the bonds for themselves (58%) or their children (30%).
HOW ELSE WOULD TAX FILERS LIKE TO RECEIVE THEIR 
REFUND?
Respondents express interest in 
paying down debt directly.
The HFS1 asked participants about their preferences 
concerning methods for receiving federal refunds and 
suggested seven alternative options (Figure 17). Thirty-nine 
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Figure 17. Percentages of HFS1 participants interested in 
receiving their tax refunds in alternative ways (n = 17,898).
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percent of participants selected at least one alternative to 
the actual method chosen for payment of the refund. The 
most popular alternative, chosen by 15% of participants, 
is to pay debt directly with the refund. Other popular 
options include directing refunds to an existing retirement 
account (13%) and directing them to a new savings account 
(12%).
ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE PREFERENCES OF BANKED 
AND UNBANKED PARTICIPANTS?
Unbanked respondents would like to open accounts or 
receive tax refunds via prepaid debit cards.
The unbanked (defined in this analysis as those who 
report lacking savings and checking accounts) comprised 
5.6% of respondents to HFS1, and their preferences for 
alternative refund-delivery methods differed from those of 
their banked counterparts (Figure 18). Receiving refunds 
on prepaid debit cards was the option least attractive to 
the banked population but most attractive to unbanked 
filers. Over one third of unbanked respondents indicated 
that they would prefer prepaid debit cards to the 
method they chose for delivery of their refunds. Other 
alternatives popular among unbanked respondents include 
new checking accounts (30%) and new savings accounts 
(23%): Unbanked participants embraced the possibility of 
becoming banked and directing the Treasury to deposit 
their refunds into new accounts.
WHAT DO PEOPLE THINK ABOUT SPLITTINg THE REFUND 
AT TAX TIME?
Many prefer to save their refund on their own.
Because splitting the tax refund across multiple accounts 
is uncommon (only 0.9% of the control group split 
refunds to deposit a portion into savings), we sought 
to assess whether respondents to the HFS2 were aware 
of the option to split the tax refund, whether they 
intended to split their refund next year, and why they 
decided not to split the current refund.
Most HFS2 respondents (69%) reported awareness of 
the ability to set aside a portion of their refund by 
splitting it into multiple accounts. Among those who 
were aware of the option, only 13% reported that 
they have ever saved a portion of their refunds by 
dividing their deposits into multiple accounts. Although 
this percentage is small, it is much greater than the 
percentage of these same individuals who split their 
refunds in the current tax season (3%). Six months 
after filing, HFS2 respondents in the R2S treatment 
groups were slightly but significantly more aware of the 
ability to split their refunds than were participants in 
the control group (68% vs. 63%, z = -2.41, p = .02). The 
difference suggests that exposure to the interventions 
raised awareness. Nevertheless, almost a third of the 
HFS2 subsample reported being unaware of the ability 
to split refunds. Improving the salience of messages 
and design features that incorporate the split option 
(Internal Revenue Service Form 8888) into the flow 
of tax filing may also help to increase take-up of this 
option.
We are encouraged by reports from 16% of HFS2 
participants that they intend to split their refund in the 
next tax season and to allocate part of it to savings. 
An additional 42% indicated that they have not decided 
yet. This suggests that intentions to split refunds are 
much higher than current utilization, and there may 
be potential to increase this behavior. However, 42% 
of HFS2 participants aware of the splitting option said 
that they do not intend to do split their refund next 
year.
In the HFS2, we investigated the main reasons why 
some participants do not plan to split their refunds 
next year. Among the response categories offered, the 
two most frequently chosen ones were “It’s easier to 
deposit into one account and split it myself from there” 
(32%), and, “I plan to spend my refund or use it to pay 
down debt” (31%).
The finding that many prefer to transfer funds to 
a savings product on their own, outside of the tax-
filing experience, has implications for the behavior 
to be targeted in future interventions. It might be 
fruitful if such efforts were to include messages that 
accommodate this preference and encourage people 
to follow through by setting aside funds. Also, people 
deliberate about the allocation of future refunds long 
before the start of tax season, and some mentally 
earmark the windfall for spending or paying down 
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Figure 18. Percentages of HFS1 participants interested in 
receiving their tax refunds in alternative ways by banked status 
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debt. Thus, early interventions may offer an effective 
way to increase the intention to save and confidence 
in the ability to save despite debt. Alternatively, debt 
reduction could be considered a desirable, welfare-
promoting behavior, and interventions could incorporate 
methods to help people address debt (e.g., promoting 
early filing to pay down debts sooner, facilitating direct 
deposits of tax refunds to retire debt, and providing 
advice on or referrals for debt consolidation).
An additional 19% of HFS2 respondents did not intend 
to split the refund next year because their “refund will 
be too small for it to make sense to split”; this suggests 
that, in evaluating success of the tax-time intervention, 
it is worth considering whether encouraging filers to split 
some refunds is realistic or worthwhile. For example, 
it is useful to consider the practicality of encouraging 
a filer to split and save a portion of a $10 refund. 
Furthermore, 7.3% of respondents who did not intend 
to split their refund said that they planned to save the 
whole refund in one account. In fact, most TTFE refund 
recipients (82%) who deposited any of their refund to 
savings vehicles deposited their entire refund to a single 
account. Because the behavioral goal is saving rather 
than splitting the refund, the tendency to save the 
whole refund should be considered in the design and 
evaluation of future tax-time savings interventions.
HOW DOES INTENDED USE OF THE REFUND AT TAX TIME 
COMPARE WITH ACTUAL USE?
Participants spent more of the refund 
on debt than they anticipated.
Data from the HFS can be used to compare participants’ 
intentions for their refunds (HFS1) with their use of the 
refunds (reported 6 months later, at the HFS2). Figure 
19 shows four refund uses commonly reported by HFS 
participants and the average percentages of refunds 
allocated to each. Results in the figure reveal that the 
uses reported in the HFS2 closely match the intended 
uses stated 6 months earlier during the HFS1. Within 
each of the assessed categories, the intended use of 
the refund correlates significantly with reported actual 
use: spending within 1 month (r = .26), saving for 
medium-term priorities (r = .21), paying down debt (r = 
.41), and saving for the long term (r = .45; p < .0001 for 
all). Participants put more of their refund toward debt 
repayment than they intended at tax time, and they 
reported spending less than anticipated.
It is noteworthy that the reported uses of refunds 
differ according to the amount of the refund, such that 
people with smaller refunds tend to spend a greater 
proportion of them and allocate a smaller proportion 
for paying down debt (see Figure 20). Compared with 
respondents who have small refunds, counterparts who 
received large refunds saved a smaller percentage for 6 
months but saved a greater dollar amount.
USE OF THE REFUND: SAVINg
Emergencies are the most common 
impetus for saving.
At the time of filing, 7.5% of TTFE filers directly 
deposited at least some of their refunds into a savings 
vehicle (savings account or bonds). In the HFS1, 
however, 32% of respondents indicated an intention to 
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save some of their refund, and 27% of HFS2 respondents 
reported 6 months later that they still had at least 
some portion of the refund saved. These results are 
consistent with the preference, reported by a portion 
of savers, to transfer funds to savings accounts outside 
of the tax-filing process. Furthermore, many savers 
mentally set aside money in products other than 
savings accounts or bonds (Table 4). For example, a 
third of savers reported that they were saving some of 
their tax refunds in their checking accounts. Thus, it 
is important to keep in mind that the measure used to 
quantify savings may influence results.
Six months after filing, participants in the HFS2 
reported that they saved (i.e., still held) 14%, or $267, 
of their tax refunds, though 73% of HFS2 participants 
reported that they did not have any of their refunds 
left. Among HFS2 respondents who reported saving any 
refund for 6 months, the average proportion of the 
refund held was 53% and average amount was $996. We 
asked those who saved some portion to indicate their 
reason for saving and showed them a list of options. 
Saving “for emergencies and other unexpected needs” 
was by far the most common option cited (Figure 21). 
This indicates that building emergency savings is a high 
priority among savers in this LMI population.
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Figure 21. Purposes for saving tax refund among HFS2 par-
ticipants who reported saving any refund for 6 months. Note: 
Participants could select more than one option (n = 2,225).
Type of account or savings vehicle
% of participants saving 
refund in this vehicle
Savings 66
Checking 33
Prepaid card 1
Retirement account 5
Education account 1
U.S. savings bonds 2
Othera 6
Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.
aRespondents could specify. Popular write-ins included money mar-
ket accounts, cash, and certificates of deposit.
Table 4. Vehicles in Which Filers Saved Their Tax Refunds (HFS1, n = 2,224)
Predictor
Saved tax 
refund or not
Amount 
saved
gross income 0 0
Federal refund amount + +
Tax refund < $250 − 0
Total liquid assets + +
Bank account ownership 0 0
Sum of unsecured liabilities − −
Sum of property and business liabilities 0 +
Has urgent debt − −
Difficulty meeting expenses − −
Number of kinds of financial shocks − −
Temporal discount rate (%)
10 − 0
25 − 0
50 − 0
100 − −
150 − −
Age − 0
Minority race or ethnicity + 0
Married 0 0
Number of dependents claimed − −
College graduate + +
Unemployed and seeking 0 0
Date of filing + +
Constant − −
Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave; 0 = not 
a significant predictor; + = positive and statistically significant 
relationship (p ≤ .05); − = negative and statistically significant 
relationship (p ≤ .05).
Table 5. Regression Models to Predict Saving of Any of the Tax Refund 
for 6 Months and the Dollar Amount Saved (HFS2, n = 6,690)
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SAVINg
Many LMI households are able to save despite obstacles.
To more closely examine factors associated with 
saving and potential barriers to saving, we estimated 
regression models that predict saving using factors 
assessed at tax time and reported stressors in the 6 
months after filing (see Table 5). A logistic regression 
model correctly identified 93% of households that 
reported not saving any of their tax refund for 6 
months and 30% of households that reported saving 
some portion for that period. Despite the thorough 
assessment of demographic and financial factors by 
the HFS, the regression model based on these factors 
underestimated who saved; many HFS2 respondents 
reported saving some of their refunds for 6 months 
even though they also reported several barriers to 
saving. The model accounts for about 15% of variance 
in whether a household saved any of its refund for 
6 months. For most of the factors, the predicted 
likelihood of saving is in the expected direction: 
Respondents with smaller refunds and fewer liquid 
assets are less likely to save. Also, urgent debt is 
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two thirds of respondents (65%, n = 5,399) used at least 
some of their refund to repay debt, and about 21% of 
HFS2 respondents used their entire refund for debt 
repayment. However, 35% of respondents did not use 
any of the refund for debt repayment. If respondents 
reported using any of the refund to repay debt, we 
provided a list of debt categories and asked them to 
choose the option that characterized the kind of debt 
they repaid. The two most common responses were 
debt from credit or charge cards (53%) and overdue 
bills (42%).
Reports on the percentages of refunds spent on debt 
repayment suggest that 41% of HFS2 respondents 
actually allocated more than they intended for that 
purpose. Respondents who reported a higher allocation 
to debt at HFS2 than at HFS1 are more likely to claim 
dependents on their returns: 42% of respondents who 
underestimated actual allocation for debt claimed 
dependents, but dependents were claimed by 26% of 
counterparts who did not underestimate (z = -14.4, p < 
.001). Those who underestimated debt repayment are 
also more likely to report having overdue bills at the 
time of the HFS1 (38% of underestimaters vs. 23% of 
others; z = -14.4, p < .001) and to indicate in the HFS2 
that they used their refunds to repay past-due bills 
(45% of underestimaters vs. 35% of others, z = -7.2, p < 
.001).
As Figure 22 illustrates, reports from the HFS2 
suggest that having certain types of debt at tax time 
is negatively associated with the likelihood of saving 
part of the refund for at least 6 months. Although 
HFS2 participants with secured debt (e.g., mortgages 
negatively associated with the likelihood of saving.8 As the 
number of dependents increases, the probability of saving 
decreases. Unsecured debt is negatively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of saving, but property 
and business debts have no association with saving. After 
accounting for the myriad financial and other demographic 
factors, we find that minority race or ethnicity is positively 
associated with the probability of saving.
The same factors can be used to predict the dollar amount 
saved for 6 months (Table 5). Estimates for most variables 
are predictive in the same direction as they were for 
estimates of the likelihood of saving. However, property 
and business liabilities are positively and significantly 
associated with the dollar amount saved. This suggests 
that secured debts may not be a barrier to saving or that 
these debts are a proxy signal of characteristics that 
enable a household to save.
USE OF THE REFUND: DEBT
Debt repayment is the most common and 
costly use of the tax refund.
In the HFS2, participants reported putting 43% (or 
$1,036) of their refund toward debt repayment. About 
8 We use the term urgent debt to refer to certain li-
abilities—negative balances in transaction accounts, 
past-due bills, payday loans, and title loans—that can 
be distinguished as urgent because the associated con-
sequences are particularly detrimental and immediate.
Figure 22. Percentages of HFS2 participants who saved part of their refunds for 6 months by type of debt held at tax filing (n = 8,126). 
* Percentages are statistically different at 95% confidence level.
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and automobile loans) saved at rates similar to those 
of participants without secured debt, there are 
differences in the savings rates of those who hold 
and lack unsecured debt (e.g., from payday loans 
and credit cards). Across all measured categories of 
unsecured debt, the savings rate among those who hold 
a type of unsecured debt is lower than the rate among 
counterparts who do not hold that type of debt. For 
example, participants with no payday loan debt at tax 
time were three times as likely as those with payday 
loan debt to have a portion of their refunds saved 6 
months later. Respondents with payday loans at tax 
time spent 56% of their refunds on debt repayment in 
the 6 months after filing, yet those with no tax-time 
payday-loan debt spent 42% of their refunds on debt 
repayment. On average, participants with payday loans 
at tax time owed $1,703 when they filed and managed 
to cut that liability to $745 by the time of the HFS2.
Respondents in the HFS1 indicated preferences 
concerning debt repayment and saving on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from very much like me to not 
at all like me. Almost two thirds (63%) of these 
respondents indicated that it is “mostly” or “very 
much” like them to prefer to pay off debt before 
starting to save. Clearly, debt is a major barrier to 
saving for this population.
USE OF THE REFUND: SPENDINg
Expenditures for essentials comprise 
the largest portion of spending.
When asked 6 months after filing taxes, HFS2 
participants indicated that they spent 23% (or $398) 
of their refund within the first month of receiving it. 
However, 49% reported that they did not spend any of 
their refund within the first month. In contrast, 11% 
said that they spent all of their refund within that 
month; these respondents tended to have much smaller 
refunds (M = $756) than respondents who did not spend 
the entire refund within 1 month (M = $2,164).
On average, HFS2 respondents also reported spending 
20% (or $482) of their tax refund in the 2–6 months 
after receiving it. About 44% of respondents reported 
spending some part of their refund in that timeframe.
The HFS2 also posed questions about how tax refunds 
were utilized in the first 6 months after tax time, 
showing a list of six expenditure categories to 
respondents who spent any of the refund (n = 5,582) 
and asking them about purchases in each category. 
As Table 6 shows, we asked respondents to indicate 
whether they spent any of the refund in a given 
expenditure category and to identify the category in 
which they spent the largest portion of their refund. 
Household expenses (70%) and necessities (57%) were 
the two most commonly selected categories. Almost 
half (49%) of respondents reported that they spent the 
most refund money on household expenses, and 14% 
reported that they spent the most on a “big-ticket 
item.”
Expenditure % who spent any on this % who spent the most on this
Household expenses such as rent, mortgage, bills, or groceries 70.3 49.3
A big-ticket item such as furniture, home repair, electronics, or a car 27.1 14.0
School or training for respondent or a family member 10.6 3.5
Necessities such as clothing, shoes, or school supplies 57.3 11.1
Special things such as gifts, toys, or a vacation 29.4 9.5
Emergencies or unexpected needs requiring immediate spending 26.6 7.0
Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave. For the “Spent any” column, respondents could select more than one option.
Table 6. Reported Spending of Tax Refunds (HFS2, n = 5,582)
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VIII. ThE FINANCIAl lIVES OF lmI 
hOUSEhOlDS
The HFS included a thorough ascertainment of household 
assets and liabilities. The details of these data offer an 
in-depth understanding of the challenging context that 
awaits policies to benefit the financial well-being of LMI 
households.
THE BALANCE SHEET
More than one in 10 HFS1 respondents reported having no 
liquid assets (i.e., money in checking or savings accounts, 
or cash saved at home), and the median value of liquid 
assets reported by HFS1 respondents was only $550. In 
this context, it is not surprising that 61% of the HFS1 
subsample indicated being “certainly” or “probably” 
unable to come up with $2,000 in an emergency. It is 
notable that HFS1 respondents reported average regular 
monthly expenses of $1,725 (the median was $1,500). 
The R2S team also asked respondents what the minimum 
monthly household expense would be “if you were to 
tighten your belt as much as possible.” The average 
minimum reported by HFS1 participants was $1,431 (the 
median was $1,250). The relatively minor difference 
between the reported typical and minimum expenses 
suggests that many households have already minimized 
expenditures. About three quarters (77%) of HFS1 
respondents indicated that they found it “somewhat” or 
“very” difficult to cover expenses and pay all of their bills 
in a typical month.
ASSETS
More than a quarter of HFS1 respondents 
lack a savings account.
In the HFS1 subsample, the sum value of all nonproperty 
and nonbusiness assets was modest. The median value 
was $1,300. Table 7 shows a summary of assets reportedly 
held at the time of the HFS1. Most respondents had 
holdings in checking and savings accounts; however, 29% 
had no savings account and 5.6% were unbanked. Being 
unbanked poses a technical barrier at the time of tax 
filing, making it difficult for filers to use direct deposit or 
to split part of a refund directly into savings.
Relatively few HFS1 respondents held any assets in 
investments such as stocks, mutual funds, money market 
accounts, brokerage accounts, or annuities. The low rates 
of investment among HFS1 respondents closely resemble, 
but are lower than, national participation rates among 
low-income households: Stock ownership was reported by 
10.6% of HFS1 respondents and by 15% of LMI households 
in the U.S. population (Tyson, 2013); 6.6% of respondents 
and 12% of LMI households in the United States reportedly 
own mutual funds (Burham, Bogdan, & Schrass, 2013). 
Holdings % with this asset Mean value ($) Median value ($)
Physical assets
Home 22.1 103,222 90,000
Other property 4.5 152,503 75,000
Car 85.2 9,089 5,500
Business 2.8 96,280 10,000
Nonproperty assets
Checking 92.2 1,530 500
Savings 70.9 2,754 300
Unused balance on prepaid card 15.1 329 50
Retirement account, IRA, or 401(k) 40.4 31,806 6,000
Certificates of deposit 5.2 11,722 4,200
Money market account 6.9 9,738 3,000
Mutual fund or hedge fund 6.6 25,508 9,000
Savings bond 11.3 1,314 400
Other bond such as corporate or treasury 1.7 6,475 1,250
Stocks 10.6 10,538 2,000
Education account (e.g., 529 Coverdell) 2.5 9,634 3,800
Cash saved at home 23.7 474 200
Loans owed to participant by others 9.1 3,193 1,000
Brokerage accounts 3.5 40,874 8,375
Annuities 2.9 42,361 18,000
Othera 1.8 30,276 8,000
Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave. Dollar amounts shown are among people with holdings in that asset. Outliers above 99th 
percentile for each category were omitted.
aRespondents could specify. The most common write-ins were tangible assets (e.g., art, jewelry, guns).
Table 7. Reported Holdings of HFS1 Participants at Tax Time
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yet, the value of holdings by the few HFS respondents 
with such assets tends to be in the thousands of dollars.
RETIREMENT SAVINgS
Even those approaching traditional retirement 
age are not financially prepared to retire.
About four in 10 respondents in the HFS1 reported having 
an IRA or other retirement account such as a 401(k); this 
is about the same as the rate for the general population 
in the United States but significantly higher than the rate 
(12%) among low-income U.S. households (Investment 
Company Institute, 2010). More than half (54%) of HFS1 
respondents over age 50 (n = 4,610) have no retirement 
funds. In the TTFE data, 8.1% of tax filers claimed credits 
for retirement savings contributions and 8.9% reported 
income from retirement distributions. About half (48%) 
of those reporting retirement-distribution income were 
younger than age 60 at the time of the first survey, 
and this may suggest that many paid a penalty on the 
distribution. On average, the retirement accounts of HFS1 
respondents held approximately $32,000, and the median 
was $6,000. The large difference between the mean and 
median may indicate that large outliers drove up the 
mean value. Low balances in the retirement savings of the 
HFS1 subsample seem to suggest the benefits of creating 
mechanisms to divert tax refunds directly to retirement 
accounts such as IRAs.
HOUSINg AND PROPERTy
Most households that own homes were unable 
to claim mortgage-interest deductions.
Just 22% of HFS1 respondents were homeowners (n 
= 4,552), and the median estimated home value was 
$90,000 (results not shown). Two thirds of homeowners 
in the HFS1 (66%) reported holding a home mortgage, 
and the median amount owed was $70,000. The median 
amount of home equity among these homeowners was 
$18,000. About one in seven HFS1 homeowners (15%) was 
“under water”—that is, they owed more on the mortgage 
than the estimated value of the home. Because they did 
not itemize their tax returns, 79% of respondents repaying 
mortgages were unable to take mortgage-interest 
deductions. Our analysis suggests that these respondents 
had no tax liability or that the standard deduction 
was larger than an itemized deduction. This finding is 
consistent with reports by others that mortgage-interest 
deduction policy disproportionately benefits high-earning 
households (Toder, Turner, Lim, & Getsinger, 2010). About 
6.3% of HFS1 respondents reported living in situations 
that do not require them to make monthly payments for 
rent or a mortgage. Among those who did make housing 
payments, the average monthly payment was $790 
(median $700). A quarter of the HFS1 subsample (25%) 
reported being unable to make the full payment for rent 
or mortgage at some point in the last year.
Most HFS1 respondents reported owning a car (85%), 
and 38% of those were making monthly car payments at 
the time of the survey. Less than 3% of this subsample 
reported business-related assets or liabilities. Only 4.5% 
reported owning property other than their primary 
residences.
LIABILITIES
The debts of most HFS1 respondents 
exceed their assets.
The HFS assessment of liabilities suggests that many LMI 
households have been coping with heavy burdens (see 
Table 8). Their survey responses depict an environment 
in which the ability to save and the perceived ability to 
Type of debt % with this debt Mean value ($) Median value ($)
Secured
Home 14.5 78,932 70,000
Other property 1.3 97,039 70,000
Car 32.6 10,172 8,200
Business 0.3 47,944 12,500
Unsecured
Credit or charge card 63.3 4,513 2,000
Education or school loan 51.0 31,173 20,000
Personal loan from family or friend 24.6 3,419 1,500
Personal loan from bank or credit union 15.3 7,726 3,500
Payday or title loan 8.0 1,227 650
Unpaid medical bill 42.2 5,054 1,500
Past-due regular bill or rent 33.4 1,067 500
Negative balance in checking or savings 8.5 355 200
Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave. Dollar amounts shown are among those who had that kind of debt. Outliers above 99th 
percentile for each category were omitted.
Table 8. Reported Debts and Liabilities of HFS1 Respondents at Tax Time (HFS1)
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 45
save are low. The debts of HFS1 respondents exceeded 
assets: The median debt owed for all unsecured liabilities 
was $10,000. As we have mentioned, the median value of 
assets was $1,300. If one excludes the value of property 
and business holdings, the mean net value of assets was 
-$5,050 and the median net worth was -$1,100.
More than one third (37%) of HFS1 participants reported 
having at least one urgent debt (defined as negative 
balances in transaction accounts, past-due bills, payday 
loans, or title loans). A similar percentage (33.4%) 
reported being overdue on bills or rent at the time 
of the survey, half owed on student loans, a quarter 
owed debt to family or friends. More than half of HFS1 
respondents (58%) reported that, over the 12 months 
prior to the HFS1, they skipped a bill or paid a bill late 
because they did not having enough money to pay it when 
due. The prevalence of overdue bills and other urgent 
debts signals that many LMI households face challenges in 
attempting to build savings.
INTEREST RATES
Most HFS2 respondents do not know 
their highest interest rate.
In the HFS2, the R2S team asked respondents to 
identify the debt for which they paid the highest 
interest rate: 57% reported that they paid the highest 
interest rate for debt owed on a credit or charge card 
account, and 18% said they paid the highest interest 
rate for debt owed on a student loan (Table 9). About 
13% of the HFS2 subsample did not know which of 
their accounts had the highest interest rate, and 
among those who could identify their highest-rate 
account, 41% reported not knowing the actual rate. 
Only 36% of HFS2 respondents were able to provide the 
interest rate of their highest interest rate account. 
The plausible range of interest rates varies by kind of 
debt (e.g., 400% would be unlikely for a student loan 
but plausible for a payday loan). For this reason, our 
analyses excluded interest rate outliers above the 
99th percentile (n = 132; 2.9% of available values). 
The mean highest interest rate across all kinds of debt 
(24%) indicates that debts with high interest rates 
are prevalent among the liabilities of this subsample. 
Table 9 presents HFS2 participants’ mean highest 
interest rates by the kind of debt, and the reported 
rates parallel known rates. For example, the interest 
rate for federal direct student loans ranged from 
3.4% to 6.8% in the last 5 years (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2014). The industry average for rates on 
private student loans is estimated to be between 9% 
and 12% (Alltuition, n.d.). Thus, a 7.7% average is 
plausible for HFS2 respondents who reported that they 
paid the highest interest rate on debt from education 
loans. The table also shows that among those whose 
highest interest debt is a payday loan, the mean 
interest rate is 202.8%. The Center for Responsible 
Lending (2014) estimates that the typical payday loan 
carries an interest rate between 391% and 521%, and 
the average rate reported among HFS2 respondents is 
on the same order of magnitude. These results suggest 
that respondents who provide interest rates for their 
highest-interest accounts are fairly accurate in their 
reports.
STUDENT DEBT
For one in 10 HFS1 respondents with student loans, 
repayments are more than half a month’s income.
Student debt comprised the largest portion of 
unsecured debt owed by HFS1 respondents. On 
average, such debt made up 42% of all unsecured debt 
owed by that subsample. Across all levels of education, 
51% of HFS1 respondents have educational debt. 
The average owed was $31,173, and the median was 
$20,000. Among those owing student loan debt, higher 
educational attainment is associated with greater 
amounts of debt: On average, HFS1 respondents 
with some college reported owing $20,308, college 
Type of account or debt
% of sample  
reporting as highest rate
Mean rate for those 
who listed as highest (%)
Credit or charge card 56.7 18.7
Education or school loan 17.7 7.7
Personal loan from friend or family 0.5 1.5
Personal loan from bank or credit union 2.9 13.3
Payday or title loan 4.5 202.8
Unpaid medical bill 2.7 30.3
Past-due regular bill or rent 1.7 17.1
Negative balance in checking or savings account 0.4 21.4
Did not know 12.8 NA
Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave.
Table 9. Debts with the Highest Interest Rate and the Interest Rate for Those Debts among Participants in the HFS2 (n = 7,722)
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graduates reported owing $31,483, and respondents 
with a graduate degree or professional education 
reported owing $60,036.
Among HSF1 respondents who were repaying student 
loans and were no longer students at the time of 
that survey, 35% indicated that they were not college 
graduates. Lacking the benefits of a degree, those 
who did not graduate may have a hard time repaying 
student loans. Furthermore, other research shows 
that debt itself can play a part in the decision not to 
complete college (Dwyer, McCloud, & Hodson, 2012).
The burden from student debt varies significantly by 
race. To investigate this variation, we estimated a 
regression using HFS1 data. The results suggest that the 
average student-debt burden of an African American 
graduating from college at age 22 would be $31,498—
over $7,800 more than that of a White college graduate 
of the same age and $11,000 more than that of an 
Asian counterpart. These racial disparities in debt from 
postsecondary education resemble outcomes found 
elsewhere (Jackson & Reynolds, 2013; Price, 2004; 
Zeiser, Kirshstein, & Tanenbaum, 2013).
Monthly payments toward educational debt also tend 
to be high in relation to income for this sample of 
LMI households. Among HFS1 participants reporting 
educational debt, the average monthly student loan 
payment was just over $220 and the median was $150. 
These households reported allocating a median of 11% 
of monthly income (and a mean of 26%) for repayment 
of educational debt. For 10% of student loan holders 
in the HFS1, the reported debt repayment exceeds 
50% of monthly household income. Such repayments 
far exceed the 8% industry standard often used as a 
threshold to determine monthly repayment structures 
(Baum & Schwartz, 2006) and the 10% level used in 
income-based repayment plans for federal student 
loans (Federal Student Aid, 2014). Likewise, TTFE data 
suggest that annual education expenses are high, yet it 
is encouraging that about seven in 10 enrolled students 
took advantage of tax deductions for educational 
expenses. On average, HFS1 respondents claimed 
deductions for $10,230 in expenditures on items like 
books, fees, and tuition (median = $5,967).
HEALTH CARE
Monetary constraints prevent many people 
from receiving necessary medical care.
Financial hardships significantly affect the ability of 
HFS1 respondents to receive proper medical care. 
Forty-five percent of HFS1 respondents reported 
that, in the year prior to the survey, financial reasons 
prompted them to forgo a visit to a doctor or hospital 
when they needed such a visit. One third (33%) 
reported skipping or postponing necessary prescription 
medications, and 52% reported that they were unable 
to afford a needed visit to a dentist. Participants 
estimated that their mean out-of-pocket medical costs 
in the previous year were $1,455 and the median was 
$500. About 42% of HFS1 participants reported medical 
debt. The average amount of such debt was more 
than $5,000, and the median was $1,500. More than a 
quarter of HFS2 respondents (27%) indicated that they 
had no health insurance. In the HFS2 subsample, the 
most commonly reported health insurance coverage 
was provided by an employer (42%), 8.4% of the 
subsample was covered by Medicaid, and 5.0% was 
covered through Medicare (see Table 10).
Insurance type
% of 
sample
Uninsured 26.7
Through employer 42.1
Medicaid 8.4
Medicare 5.0
Private or direct 4.9
Student or school plan 4.3
Other (specified)
On parent or family plan 5.4
Military-related (e.g., Veterans Administration, Tricare) 1.3
State, county, tribal, or other government 1.2
Other 0.6
Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave.
Table 10. Types of Health Insurance Coverage Reported in the HFS2 (n 
= 8,189)
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Ix. COpING wITh lACk OF SAVINGS
Our data show that LMI households frequently 
experience unexpected financial emergencies. In the 
absence of sufficient contingency savings to contend 
with such events, households must cope by coming up 
with funds (often from financially penalizing alternative 
sources), falling behind on bills, or cutting back on 
material necessities. In this way, as detailed below, the 
lack of savings may compound and prolong the financial 
and personal hardships faced by LMI households.
VOLATILITy
Two thirds of respondents experienced a financial 
shock in the 6 months after filing taxes.
At the time of tax filing, 11% of HFS1 respondents 
were unemployed and looking for work; this compares 
with a nationwide unemployment rate of about 7.6% 
over the same period (February–April 2013; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2014a). Six months later, 34% of 
HFS2 participants who previously reported that they 
were unemployed indicated that they were working 
full time. An additional 20% reported working part 
time, 31% said that they were still unemployed and 
looking; and 6.7% told us that they were unemployed 
but no longer looking for a job. About one third of 
HFS2 respondents (33%) indicated that someone in 
their household experienced a period of unemployment 
between the first and second waves of the survey, and 
36% reported that a household member started a new 
job or changed jobs within the last 6 months. In the 
same 6-month period, 22% of respondents changed 
residences, and 47% of these respondents moved away 
from the city or town in which they were living when 
they filed taxes.
Approximately two thirds of HFS2 households reported 
that they experienced a financial emergency, such 
as a trip to the hospital, major vehicle repair, period 
of unemployment, or legal expense, in the 6 months 
since filing their tax returns (see Figure 23). The high 
prevalence of these emergencies in the 6 months 
following tax filing is important because almost 60% of 
the 20,000 tax filers who completed the HFS1 survey at 
tax time said that they could not come up with $2,000 
within 30 days if they needed to cover a financial 
emergency.
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES
Use of alternative financial services is lower 
among respondents who have credit cards 
than among those who lack them.
In order to cope with the emergencies that arose, 
many of these LMI taxpayers used high-risk, high-cost 
options—choices with the potential to negatively affect 
financial strength and household well-being in both 
the short term and the long run. Alternative financial 
services are an array of controversial services provided 
by nonbank financial institutions. In assessing the use 
of such services, the HFS distinguishes alternative 
financial transaction services—check cashing, money 
orders, payroll cards (payment for wages on debit 
cards), and remittance (out of country wire transfers 
via nonbank institutions)—from alternative financial 
credit services: payday loans, auto title loans, 
refund-anticipation loans, pawning, and rent-to-
own arrangements. In general, alternative financial 
transaction services provide banking services via 
nontraditional institutions, whereas alternative 
financial credit services provide immediate access to 
liquid funds. All of these services, especially the credit 
services, are usually associated with high fees or high 
interest rates (Fellowes & Mabanta, 2008; Temkin & 
Sawyer, 2004).
Similar to previous research in this area (see, e.g., 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2013a), 
results from the HFS1 show that a large proportion 
of respondent households use alternative financial 
services (Figure 24). About 41% of HFS1 respondents 
reported using such a service in the 12 months prior 
to the survey. The rate for the use of alternative 
transaction services is comparable with that for the use 
of alternative credit services: 30% of HFS1 respondents 
reported using an alternative transaction service in 
the year prior to the survey, and 28% reported using an 
alternative credit service over that period.
Certain factors assessed by the HFS1 are associated 
with the reported use of alternative financial services 
in the 6 months after filing taxes (assessed by HFS2): 
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Figure 23. Percentage of households experiencing financial 
shocks in the 6 months after filing taxes (n = 8,253).
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having less than a college education (z = 3.56, p < .01; 
results not shown) and being a racial or ethnic minority 
(z = 9.13, p < .01). Lower gross income is associated 
with a higher likelihood of using such services (z = 
-3.01, p < .01). In results from a model accounting for 
other demographic and financial factors (e.g., age, 
gender, account ownership), the predicted probability 
that Whites use an alternative financial service is 24%, 
whereas the predicted probability for a racial or ethnic 
minority is 40%. Finally, experience of a financial shock 
(e.g., hospitalization or major car repair) during the 6 
months after filing is associated with use of an alternative 
financial service over the same period: 40% of HFS2 
respondents who experienced a financial shock during 
that period also reported using such services, whereas 
24% of respondents who did not experience a financial 
shock used them.
Compared with counterparts who lacked mainstream 
financial products in the HFS1, respondents who had such 
products were less likely to report use of alternative 
financial services at tax time and 6 months later. 
Specifically, having a checking or savings account (at the 
time of the HFS1) is negatively correlated with use of 
alternative services in the year prior to filing (z = -7.77, 
p < .01) as well as in the 6-month follow-up period (z = 
-5.40, p < .01); having a credit card is also negatively 
associated with the use of alternative services in the year 
before filing (z = -9.45, p < .01) and in the subsequent 6 
months (z = -4.79, p < .01). People with higher balances 
in their checking account are less likely to use alternative 
credit services in the year prior to filing (z = -3.89, p < 
.01) and 6 months afterward (z = -2.23, p < .05), but 
checking account balance is not correlated with use of 
alternative transaction services. Savings account balance 
and cash saved at home are not associated with use of 
either category of alternative financial services.
The HFS also specifically assesses current debts from 
payday and title loans, including loans from storefront 
and Internet-based providers. At tax time, 6.3% of the 
HFS1 respondents reported having such debt, and 57% 
of respondents who reported debt from payday or title 
loans in the HFS1 also reported such debt in the HFS2. The 
average amount of debt from payday and title loans was 
$1,226, and the median was $650.
MATERIAL HARDSHIP
Many households cope with financial shocks by 
skipping bill payments or medical care.
Data from the HFS2 also reveal that many participants 
experienced material hardship in the 6 months after they 
filed their taxes. Over 17% of HFS2 households failed 
to make at least one rent or mortgage payment during 
that period, and nearly 46% skipped a bill payment. 
Results from HFS2 parallel results from HFS1 in showing 
that financial concerns prompted many participants to 
forgo necessary medical care (33%), dental care (40%), 
and prescription medicine (22%). In the 6 months after 
filing taxes, struggles with financial institutions, such as 
overdrawing a bank account (27%) and having a credit 
card application declined (12%), were also prevalent.
Our analyses indicate that the experience of a financial 
shock is closely tied to the experience of material 
hardship. Over 80% of HFS2 respondents who experienced 
a financial emergency in the 6 months after filing taxes 
indicated that they went without a necessity over 
the same 6-month period. As Figure 25 shows, HFS2 
respondents who reported experience of a financial 
shock were significantly more likely to have skipped a 
rent payment (22%), the purchase of needed medications 
(27%), bill payments (53%), and necessary medical care 
(39%).
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Figure 25. Prevalence of material hardship by experience of 
financial shock in the 6 months following tax filing (n = 8,234).
0
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
R
em
itt
an
ce
P
ay
ro
ll 
ca
rd
C
he
ck
 c
as
hi
ng
M
on
ey
 o
rd
er
A
ut
o 
tit
le
 lo
an
R
en
t t
o 
ow
n
P
ay
da
y 
lo
an
P
aw
n 
sh
op
Credit AFS Transaction AFS
17%
10%
6% 6%
23%
10%
7%
5%
Figure 24. Percentage of HFS1 respondents reporting use of 
alternative financial services (AFS) in the 12 months prior to 
survey by type of service (n = 19,591). Note: HFS1 = House-
hold Financial Survey, first wave.
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x. BEhAVIORAl INSIGhTS
Certain items in the HFS sought to assess behaviors 
and perceptions related to the financial lives of LMI 
households. The assessment of methods for money 
management offers insight into popular strategies and 
may inform decisions about the platforms that could be 
used to deliver future interventions to foster financial 
well-being. We also ascertained the perceived value of 
a hypothetical reward for delaying receipt of a sum of 
money. Variation in this perception and association of 
this measure with financial assets and liabilities suggest 
a complex environment in which the value of a return 
on investment from savings varies from person to 
person, even when the dollar amount is the same.
MONEy MANAgEMENT STRATEgIES
More than half of respondents track 
their finances electronically.
Participants in the HFS1 reported using a variety of 
tools to manage their money (see Figure 26). The use 
of computer and mobile applications to track budgets 
was common: 60% indicated that they utilize some 
form of electronic budgeting. In contrast, 14% of 
respondents reported that they exclusively use pen-
and-paper methods. Online banking was the most 
commonly reported method of money management, 
with about half of respondents indicating that they 
track their budget on a bank’s website. About half 
(49%) of HFS1 respondents indicated that it is “mostly” 
or “very much” like them to budget carefully, and an 
additional 33% said that it is “somewhat” like them to 
budget carefully. However, about 17% did not report 
using any money management strategy. Approximately 
25% of participants said that they spend more than they 
make in most months. Compared with respondents who 
reported having money management strategies, those 
who reported no such strategy were significantly more 
likely to report spending more money than they make 
(23% vs. 31%, z = -8.59, p < .001).
TEMPORAL DISCOUNTINg
A quarter of HFS1 respondents would rather 
have $100 now than $200 in a year.
Responses from HFS1 participants illustrate temporal 
discounting: They were more likely to forgo delayed 
rewards for immediate ones, even if the delayed ones 
were larger (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 
2002). The R2S team administered survey items to 
gauge participants’ willingness to forgo a hypothetical 
offering of $100 in exchange for $103, $110, $125, 
$150, or $200 at a later time (questions adapted 
from Thaler, 1981). Participants indicating that they 
would not wait 1 year for a larger lump sum payment 
were directed to the next offer in the sequence. For 
instance, if a respondent indicated that immediate 
receipt of $100 was preferable to receiving $110 in 1 
year, the next item asked whether he or should would 
prefer to receive $100 now or $125 in 1 year.
As Figure 27 shows, when asked whether they would 
prefer to forgo an immediate offer of $100 in exchange 
for an extra $3 in 12 months, over 86% of HFS1 
respondents indicated a preference to receive $100 
immediately. Larger offers produced similar results: 
76% of respondents preferred the immediate offer to 
$110 in a year, and 61% preferred it to $125 in a year. 
Almost half (over 46%) of HFS1 respondents expressed 
a preference for the immediate reward over the option 
with a 50% annual gain (from $100 to $150). Roughly 
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Figure 26. Money management strategies of HFS1 respon-
dents (n = 19,129). Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, 
first wave.
Figure 27. Percentage of respondents who would take $100 
now rather than wait 1 year for more than $100 (HFS1, n = 
18,932). Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.
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a quarter of respondents indicated that even a $100 
incentive (a 100% gain over a year) would not be 
enough to convince them to wait for 1 year.
Many HFS1 respondents expressed a preference to forgo 
large incentives that greatly exceed realistic returns 
on investment and expected inflation. These findings 
should be seen in the context of real-world choices. 
For example, savings accounts routinely offer a yield 
of approximately 0.07% (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2013b), and many HFS1 respondents 
indicated that they would have declined an offer with 
a 50% yield. This raises questions about the willingness 
and ability of LMI households’ to set aside funds in 
products with minimal interest rates, particularly if the 
alternative is consumption or short-term reward. 
The tendency to reject larger rewards in the future 
for a smaller one in the present may be indicative 
of competing preferences for immediate, everyday 
consumption (Illustration 4). Furthermore, households 
may be especially motivated by this tendency at tax 
time, anticipating a lump sum in the form of the tax 
refund. In looking at respondents’ reported willingness 
to wait for a higher gain and considering preferences 
by R2S test period, we observe a general pattern: Early 
filers are more likely to prefer to receive the $100 
immediately than to wait for even a 100% gain after a 
year. This preference was expressed by roughly 27% of 
filers in Period 1 and by 16% of counterparts in Period 
3. Although there is no financial incentive for those who 
receive refunds to file late in the tax season (rather, 
procrastination is associated with potential losses, such 
as accrued interest on debts), the fact that early filers 
exhibit less tolerance for delayed reward suggests that 
they file early in part because they attribute greater 
value to immediately accessible funds. 
The disproportionate value that HFS1 participants 
assign to immediate money is in part determined by 
material needs. Evidence for this point can be found in 
results from an analysis of the temporal discounting. 
As Figure 28 illustrates, the acceptable amount of 
reward for waiting a year is inversely correlated with 
liquid assets at the time of filing: Respondents with 
higher liquid assets at filing accept lower incentives 
for waiting a year. Respondents who would wait a 
year for a mere $3 gain have more than four times the 
liquid assets of those who said that a $100 gain was not 
enough to justify waiting. Moreover, respondents who 
would not wait a year for a $100 gain are more than 
twice as likely to have urgent debt as those who would 
wait for $3 (results not shown). Thus, the value of an 
immediate dollar tends to be higher (and the value of a 
distant dollar lower) for respondents with urgent debt 
and for respondents with fewer liquid assets.
SUMMARy OF DESCRIPTIVE FINDINgS IN THE R2S STUDy
The detailed data from the HFS and associated tax 
data depict a challenging environment in which many 
LMI households find it difficult to set aside savings. Yet 
many households do save in this context. This in-depth 
examination of household balance sheets and behavior 
provides insights into preferences for the payment 
of tax refunds, predictors of saving, and methods of 
coping with the lack of adequate savings. In designing 
and implementing strategies to promote financial well-
being, researchers and policymakers can apply the 
lessons learned from these investigations.
Illustration 4.  A context of pressing needs may affect percep-
tion of the value of an immediate dollar versus a future dollar.
0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
>$100$100 $50 $25 $10 $3 
H
FS
1 
liq
ui
d 
as
se
ts
Additional amount it would take to
make waiting a year worthwhile
Figure 28. Respondents who would wait a year for smaller 
incentives tend to have more liquid assets (HFS1, n = 18,026). 
Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.
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xI. CONClUSION
The R2S initiative seeks to increase savings, build 
financial stability, and increase financial mobility 
among LMI households by making the saving of tax 
refunds easier and more automatic, and by increasing 
the salience of potential reasons to save. In pursuit 
of these goals, the initiative has built a series of 
rigorously designed and scalable interventions.
In 2013, R2S tested tax-time savings interventions 
in a randomized controlled trial with approximately 
680,000 LMI tax filers. Embedded in TTFE, a free 
tax-preparation software available for qualified LMI 
households, the experiment tested interventions aimed 
at increasing the number of savers and the amount 
saved from the income tax refund. In addition, the R2S 
team conducted the in-depth longitudinal HFS with a 
large subset of tax filers who opted to participate. The 
team then merged survey data with administrative data 
from the tax-time experiment to create a rich data set 
for examining the effects of the interventions and the 
financial lives of LMI households.
The 2013 experiment tested two main behavioral 
mechanisms: motivational prompts and default 
suggested savings amounts (also known as anchors). 
The experiment employed these mechanisms in various 
combinations to determine which intervention is 
most effective for increasing savings. In addition, the 
design made saving a salient default option instead of 
requiring taxpayers to opt into depositing their refunds 
into a savings vehicle. Importantly, the second wave of 
the HFS enables us to examine the persistence of the 
effects of interventions over time.
The results of the 2013 R2S experiment are promising 
and suggest that low-touch behavioral interventions can 
increase the proportion of filers who deposit refunds 
directly into savings and the size of those deposits. 
Although the effect sizes are relatively modest, so 
too are the subtle behavioral interventions employed. 
The project, already tested at large scale, highlights 
the potential for these low-cost interventions to make 
an impact on an even larger scale. Theoretically, the 
most effective interventions could be applied via any 
electronic tax-filing software (e.g., those used by all 
Free File Alliance members or commercial products) 
and could be modified and tested beyond the electronic 
setting with third-party tax preparers (e.g., though the 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program or by paid 
preparers).
We also find that the impact of R2S interventions 
seems to last for at least 6 months. Statistical analyses 
demonstrate that certain R2S interventions are 
positively associated with the likelihood of saving and 
with the amount still saved 6 months after tax filing. 
Although the probability that control-group members 
reported saving a portion of their refunds for 6 months 
was around 25%, it was 30% for certain treatment 
groups. That we observed effects on behavior 6 months 
after filers briefly encountered relatively minor design 
changes is noteworthy.
In addition to the main questions posed by the 
experiment, we are able to address many other 
questions of relevance to policymakers interested in 
the financial stability and mobility of LMI households. 
For instance, the study’s data show the following:
•	 Many LMI households are able to save tax 
refund money despite barriers.
•	 Saving for emergencies was the most commonly 
cited reason to save.
•	 Debt repayment accounts for the greatest 
portion of tax refund usage.
Summary of findings of the R2S experiment
• Behavioral economics techniques can substantially increase the number of people who deposit to savings
at tax time.
• The interventions designed to encourage people to split their refunds into savings vehicles nearly
doubled the rate of splitting.
• The interventions increased the amount of money deposited into savings by almost $6 million.
• The low-touch interventions continued to positively affect saving outcomes and perceptions of financial
 security 6 months after tax filing.
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•	 Most people who spent the tax refund reported 
spending it on necessities.
•	 People without bank accounts are interested 
in receiving their tax refunds on prepaid debit 
cards or as deposits to newly opened bank 
accounts.
•	 Age-eligibility requirements prevent many 
working single people from receiving the EITC.
•	 Many people approaching retirement age have 
no funds set aside for retirement.
•	 Perceptions of the value of an immediate dollar 
depend on indicators of financial well-being 
such as liquid assets and urgent debt.
The longitudinal HFS provides valuable insights into 
the financial situations of and challenges facing 
LMI households. We find that nearly two thirds of 
households used some part of their tax refund to pay 
down existing debt, and many have already mentally 
allocated next year’s refund for paying down debt. 
Six months after filing, most participants (73%) did 
not have any of their refund left. Several factors are 
associated with use of refunds for purposes other than 
savings: having unsecured or urgent debt, experiencing 
a negative financial shock in the months prior to filing, 
and claiming dependents on the federal return. We 
find it encouraging that many unbanked respondents 
expressed interest in opening and depositing into new 
accounts at tax time.
A close look at the balance sheets of this sample of LMI 
households reveals evidence of a challenging financial 
environment. Among respondents to the HFS1, the 
median value of nonproperty and nonbusiness assets 
was $1,300 whereas the median value of unsecured 
liabilities was $10,000. If property holdings are 
included, the median net worth of these respondents 
was negative ($1,100). Student debt played an 
important role in the balance sheets of this group: Over 
half of participants reported education debt, and the 
median liability was $20,000.
The survey also revealed volatility in the financial 
lives of participants during the months following the 
2013 tax filing. Two thirds of participants reported a 
trip to the hospital, a major vehicle repair, a period 
of unemployment, or legal expenses. These negative 
financial shocks are associated with economically 
detrimental behaviors such as the use of high-cost 
alternative financial services, skipping bill and rent 
payments, and overdrawing bank accounts.
Our analyses reveal that the trade-off between current 
resources and future financial gains—a trade-off that 
involves forgoing near-term consumption so that 
resources can be invested for long-term gains—may 
be one complicating factor in efforts to increase the 
savings of LMI households, which may be driven by 
pressing financial needs. When asked whether they 
would rather receive $100 immediately or a larger 
windfall in 1 year, almost all participants preferred 
the short-term gain despite increasingly lucrative 
incentives to wait for a year. In fact, one quarter 
of respondents would take $100 now even if the 
alternative were to receive double that amount in a 
year.
The lessons drawn from the 2013 R2S experiment can 
inform policy discussions on efficient and effective 
interventions to increase the financial stability and 
mobility of vulnerable populations. The experiment has 
shown that behavioral economics techniques can be 
used in a low-touch, scalable manner to increase saving 
behavior at tax time. These results will be incorporated 
into the next rounds of work by the R2S initiative 
and will, we hope, enable the R2S team to identify 
increasingly effective interventions.
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